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Abstract 
There is increasing international interest in using Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) to assess 
health care provider performance. PROMs are a fundamental advance on existing indicators of health care 
quality in two respects: they equate outcomes with value added (i.e. health gain) from treatment rather than 
post-treatment health status, and they allow clinical quality to be measured at the level of the individual 
medical intervention to a far greater extent than existing failure-based indicators of quality such as 
mortality or readmissions. Most existing econometric studies of hospital competition and quality equate 
outcomes with post-treatment health status, and use mortality rates of various kinds as indicators of overall 
hospital performance, in spite of the fact that mortality is a relatively uncommon outcome in the spheres of 
hospital activity - such as elective surgery - in which competition for patients does occur. This paper 
contributes to the development of a value-added, multi-product conception of hospital quality by studying 
the impact of a major competition-promoting reform to the English NHS in 2006, in which patients were 
allowed to choose which hospital they attended for elective surgery, on PROMs of health gain from hip 
and knee replacement, groin hernia repair, and varicose vein surgery. In contrast to the existing literature, I 
find that the competition brought about by the introduction of patient choice of hospital may have had a 
negative effect on clinical quality. I put forward a theoretical framework that explains these findings, and 
conclude by arguing that future research should model the hospital as a multi-product firm, and capture 
clinical quality using value-added outcome measures. 
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1 Introduction
There is increasing international interest in using Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) from
health interventions to assess the performance of health care providers. The English NHS distributes
PROMs to all patients undergoing selected elective surgical procedures, while the US Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services has declared its intention to base reimbursement decisions on PROMs as part of
its commitment to link 50 per cent of Medicare payments for primary care to quality or value by 2018
(CMS 2016).
PROMs are value-added measures of provider quality because they survey patients on health status
both before and after an intervention, and equate outcomes with the gain in health status from the
intervention. In this respect, PROMs are a fundamental advance on existing indicators of health care
quality, which equate health outcomes with post-treatment health status. The fact that health outcomes
are inuenced by patient characteristics, which are often poorly observed, means that nal outcomes
(post-treatment health status) are a problematic indicator of provider quality. A similar situation exists
in education, where outcomes (e.g. exam results) are a joint product of student characteristics and school
quality. While the economics of education literature has, in recognition of this situation, increasingly
focused over the last decade on value-added measures of school quality, the health economics literature
has largely continued to equate hospital outcomes with nal patient health status, because value-added
measures of health outcomes such as PROMs are much less widely available than in education.
Past experience in education suggests that shifting the focus of performance measurement from
nal outcomes to value added can upend provider rankings and overturn conventional wisdom about
the drivers of provider quality (see e.g. Adams & Bengtsson 2017). With this in mind, the present
paper returns to a widely studied question within health economics the impact of xed-price hospital
competition on clinical quality to examine whether results from the existing literature can be reproduced
when value-added quality measures are used. Since April 2009, PROMs surveys have been distributed to
all English NHS patients undergoing one of four elective surgical procedures1 hip and knee replacement,
groin hernia repair and varicose vein stripping. I merge these PROMs with the Hospital Episode Statistics
(HES), which includes an observation for every NHS-funded inpatient hospital stay, to study the impact of
a major competition-promoting reform in 2006 that enabled patients to choose which hospital they attend
for elective surgery. Hospitals received a xed tari¤(or price) for each patient treated hence patient
choice meant that hospitals were forced to compete for patient referrals, instead of being guaranteed a
given patient load via bulk contracts with care purchasers as had previously been the case.
This paper studies the impact of the competition engendered by these patient choice reforms on
clinical quality as captured by PROMs health gains from elective surgery, using instrumentation strategies
to address endogeneity arising from patient choices, and exploiting the value-added nature of PROMs
to control for aspects of patient health status that are correlated with competition intensity. While
previous studies have generally found that hospital competition after 2006 led to higher hospital quality,
this paper nds that, when value-added measures of quality are used, hospital competition may have led
to lower care quality. While I argue that these divergent results are likely driven by di¤erential responses
to competition across hospital outputs, rather than by the use of a value-added indicator of quality per
se, it is only because of the existence of new, value-added indicators of hospital performance that it has
been possible to detect these di¤erential e¤ects.
As well as examining the impact of hospital competition on value-added measures of clinical quality
for the rst time, this paper contributes to a second new line of investigation concerning the impact of
market structure on hospital performance, by modelling the hospital as a multi-product rm. Standard
economic models of xed-price hospital competition (Gaynor 2006; Gaynor & Town 2012) assume that
hospitals produce a single type of output, and choose a single, hospital-wide quality level. They predict
that increased competition will lead to higher quality so long as the regulated price exceeds the marginal
cost with respect to quantity the intuition being that, if prices are xed, hospitals only have one choice
variable, quality, and will therefore compete for market share on this basis.
The econometric literature on market structure and hospital outcomes largely works within this
single-output-type theoretical framework, by focusing on indicators of hospital performance  such as
1Elective surgery encompasses any surgical procedure that is not urgent or an emergency, and which can therefore be
scheduled in advance.
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mortality rates  that not only equate outcomes with nal patient health status, but also implicitly
or explicitly assume that clinical quality is a hospital-wide variable, or has a signicant hospital-wide
component.2 Three previous studies (Cooper et al. 2011; Gaynor et al. 2013; Bloom et al. 2015) assessed
the impact of the 2006 English NHS patient choice reforms on care quality by using mortality-based
performance indicators as proxies for overall hospital quality, and obtained results consistent with the
basic theoretical prediction just outlined competition resulting from the 2006 introduction of patient
choice led to higher clinical quality as captured by mortality rates. By contrast, this paper puts forward a
model in which the impact of hospital competition on product quality is di¤erentiated by output type, and
inuenced by the complementarities and substitutabilities between output types in production. Informed
by this framework, it uses PROMs to examine the impact of hospital competition on clinical quality at
the level of the individual surgical procedure, nding that the competition brought about by patient
choice may have led to lower clinical quality. Although the estimates reported here are provisional, they
point to the need for follow-up work that studies the impact of market structure on hospital performance
in a multi-product, value-added setting.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section Two describes the English NHS patient
choice reforms, summarises the literature on hospital competition and clinical quality, and introduces
Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs). Section Three presents evidence that there is little
correlation between a hospitals performance in relation to mortality, and its elective surgery quality as
captured by PROMs health gains. This nding suggests that analysing the impact of hospital competition
on quality by focusing exclusively on mortality rates, as the existing literature has done, potentially
fails to take account of important dimensions of hospital performance, quality and productivity and
it provides a compelling rationale for looking at the impact of the introduction of patient choice of
hospital for elective surgery within the English NHS using elective-surgery-specic outcome measures.
Section Four extends existing theoretical models of hospital competition to a multi-product setting,
and shows that competition might have a more ambiguous e¤ect on product quality than is suggested
by standard single-output-type models, depending on the observability of di¤erent outputs and the
interaction between outputs in the hospital cost function. Section Five outlines the papers identication
strategy and measures of competition intensity, and presents the data. Section Six presents the results,
while Section Seven discusses and concludes.
2 Policy background and literature review
2.1 Market-based reforms to the English NHS
The English NHS is funded by general taxation and o¤ers health care that is largely free at the point of
use. Before 1991, the Department of Health paid geographically-dened Health Authorities to directly
manage hospitals. In 1991, the Conservative government made hospitals and other care providers into
independent trusts, thus creating an NHS Internal Marketin which Health Authorities and GP fund
holders purchased care by entering into bulk contracts with providers.3 Hospitals were encouraged
to compete for contracts on price as well as on quality, yet there was virtually no publicly available
information about the quality of care. This situation gave hospitals an incentive to compete on price at
the expense of quality. Propper et al. (2004; 2008) nd that, under the Internal Market, competition
led to higher mortality rates for acute myocardial infarction (AMI, or heart attack), as well as shorter
elective surgery waiting times. These ndings, combined with earlier research showing that competition
in the Internal Market led to lower costs and prices (Propper 1996; Propper et al. 1998; Söderlund et
al. 1997), suggest that competition during this period led hospitals to focus on observable dimensions
of performance (prices and waiting times) at the expense of unobservable dimensions (care quality, as
measured by mortality rates).4
2One prominent recent exception is a Working Paper by Colla et al. (2016), whose concerns are complementary to those
of this paper.
3While the Internal Market was justied using the rhetoric of choice and competition, patients had little say over where
they were sent for care.
4This interpretation is consistent with predictions from the theoretical literature (Dranove & Satterthwaite 1992; 2000)
that, when prices are exible and signals of quality are poor, the e¤ect of competition on hospital quality is likely to be
negative. It can also be seen as an application of Holmstrom & Milgroms (1991) multi-tasking result, in which incentivising
observable dimensions of performance can lead to better or worse performance in unobservable dimensions, depending
on whether there are cost complementarities or substitutabilities between observable and unobservable dimensions of
performance.
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On its election in 1997, the new Labour government declared the end of the Internal Market and
announced that health policy would henceforth promote cooperation rather than competition. However,
the institutional distinction between providers and purchasers was not abolished, and so the possibility
of hospital competition remained, even though it was discouraged at the rhetorical level.
In 2002, the Labour government changed its position on markets within the NHS, and progressively
reintroduced competition. This new era of hospital competition had four design pillars. First, price
negotiation between providers and purchasers was replaced with a prospective reimbursement regime,
Payment by Results (PBR), that paid hospitals a xed price per procedure, with some adjustment for
patient severity, local wage rates, and hospital characteristics. Secondly, a range of new providers (such as
NHS Foundation Trusts, and Independent Sector Treatment Centres) were introduced alongside standard
NHS trusts, with clearer incentives to increase their market shares. Thirdly, and at the centre of the
reform programme, from January 2006 patients requiring elective surgery were entitled to a choice of four
or ve hospitals, including one private hospital, when booking their rst outpatient appointment. From
April 2008, patients could choose to be treated at any hospital in England, NHS or private, that was
qualied to provide the procedure and willing to accept the standard NHS price. Fourthly, to facilitate
informed choice, improved signals of quality were introduced via the establishment in 2007 of the NHS
Choices website (http://www.nhs.uk), which provided users with a range of quantitative and qualitative
information about the performance of alternative providers.
Compared with the 1990s NHS Internal Market, the hospital market established under Labour was
a major improvement, with many design features reecting an awareness of the factors that led the
Internal Market to fail poor producer and purchaser incentives, quality-reducing price competition, and
poor information about quality. Existing econometric evidence, mostly using mortality-based outcome
measures, suggests that the competitive reforms of the 2000s did lead to higher hospital quality. Cooper
et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013), both using a DiD strategy, nd that hospital competition led to
larger reductions in 30-day in-hospital AMI mortality, and in-hospital mortality from all causes (whether
in-hospital or after discharge), in high-competition areas than elsewhere. Bloom et al. (2015) use
the percentage of parliamentary constituencies in a hospitals market as an instrument for competition
intensity the idea being that hospitals serving marginal constituencies are less likely to be closed, and
therefore that markets with many marginal constituencies will be more competitive than other markets 
nding that higher competition led to higher overall management quality, as well as lower AMI mortality.
While the econometric rigour of the three aforementioned studies (Cooper et al. 2011; Gaynor et
al. 2013; Bloom et al. 2015) is widely acknowledged, there has been controversy over how to interpret
their ndings, above all because the clinical outcome variables they focus on AMI or total mortality
rates are not directly relevant to the sphere of hospital activity, elective surgery, that was subject to
the introduction of patient choice.5 Peri-operative mortality is close to zero for most elective surgical
procedures; most hospital deaths are instead related to chronic illnesses or terminal conditions, or else are
admitted on an emergency basis (as is the case for AMI patients). Indeed, Gaynor et al. (2011) suggest
that one way of interpreting these three studies is that increased competition led to higher emergency
care quality, as this is where a signicant percentage of hospital deaths occur. Thus, a reform a¤ecting
one area of hospital activity, elective surgery, appears to have led to performance improvements in other
areas of hospital activity. The question naturally arises how should we understand the link between the
two? The argument must be that (1) hospital competition in elective surgery led to quality improvements
in elective surgery, and that (2) this led to quality improvements in other areas of hospital activity either
(2a) because clinical quality is a hospital-wide variable or has a hospital-wide component and/or (2b)
because of positive spillovers between elective surgery quality and quality in other areas.
Claim (1), which is the major focus of this paper, has been a source of considerable controversy, yet
remains largely unexamined by the econometric literature.6 Many health policy analysts remain skeptical
5One argument in defence of these studies is that their focus on outcomes in areas of hospital activity not subject to
competition was made deliberately, in order to attenuate bias from endogeneity between hospital quality and measures of
market structure arising from patientschoices (Bloom et al. 2011). This is a valid rationale for adopting such an approach,
but it does not obviate the di¢ culties of interpretation that ow from it.
6One study (Feng et al. 2015) examines the association between hospital competition in the English NHS and hip
replacement surgery quality as captured by PROMs health gains in 2011/12, nding no statistically signicant relationship
between the two. However, they do not seek to draw causal inferences. By contrast, the present paper examines all
four PROMs procedures using four years of data, and seeks to draw causal conclusions by using instrumental variables
estimation to address potential sources of endogeneity.
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that competition will improve clinical quality, because patients cannot or do not choose a hospital on
this basis (Jones & Mays 2009; Fotaki et al. 2008; Colla et al. 2016). Moreover, it is unclear whether
the preconditions of an e¤ective hospital market existed in England after the introduction of patient
choice. Early assessments suggested that implementation and awareness of the existence of patient
choice were poor.7 In addition, during the four-year period studied in this paper, the NHS Choices
website did not report average hospital PROMs health gains to patients undergoing one of the four
PROMs surgical procedures (and of course, for all other elective surgical procedures no such indicator
of elective surgical quality was collected). Instead, visitors to the NHS Choices website were presented
with an overwhelming and confusing list of dozens of di¤erent dimensions of comparison, including some
clinically relevant variables, but also including numerous clinically irrelevant variables such as availability
of car parking and the quality of hospital food catering.8 Notwithstanding these deciencies in o¢ cial
e¤orts to disseminate information about hospital quality, the patient choice reforms may have enabled
patients and their General Practitioners to act on any private information they possessed about hospital
quality when making a joint decision about referral. Moreover, the mere threat of losing market share as
a consequence of the patient choice reforms may have spurred hospitals to improve clinical quality, even
if few patients did make active choices. Whether the patient choice reforms did indeed lead to higher
elective surgery quality is ultimately an empirical question answering this question is the objective of
this paper.
If claim (2a) were true, then the existing econometric assessments of the patient choice reforms,
by showing that competition led to lower mortality, would have e¤ectively proved claim (1). However,
Section 3 shows that there is no evidence that hospital mortality rates are correlated with elective surgery
quality as captured by PROMs health gains. Mortality rates cannot, therefore, be taken as a proxy for
elective surgery quality.9
Claim (2b) is plausible, but it is equally possible that improving quality in one area of hospital activity
could lead to a deterioration of quality in other areas (for example, via diversion of managerial attention).
This possibility points to the need to develop a better understanding of the way in which changes to
incentive structures in one area of a hospital might not only a¤ect performance in that area, but might
also have knock-on e¤ects in other areas of hospital activity. As Propper (2012) writes, in the literature on
hospital competition and quality there is a black boxin our understanding of exactly what purchasers,
managers, and clinical practitioners do in response to competition that a¤ects outcomes. The nding by
Bloom et al. (2015) that increased hospital competition leads to higher across-the-board management
quality is presumably one important component of this black box but the trade-o¤s faced by managers
mean that improved overall management quality need not necessarily imply improved care quality in all
areas of hospital activity. This paper aims to open up Proppers black boxby examining the e¤ect of
introducing patient choice of hospital for elective surgery on elective-surgery-specic outcome measures;
in so doing, it also aims to shed light on the way in which changes in elective surgery quality are (or are
not) transmitted to other parts of the hospital.
7Surveys indicated that only 30 percent of elective surgery patients recalled being o¤ered choice in 2006, rising to only
47 percent in 2009. Similarly, in 2006, 29 percent of patients were aware they were entitled to a choice of hospital before
visiting their GP, rising to only 50 percent in 2009 (Dixon et al. 2010).
8For example, a visitor in October 2012 would have found information about a limited set of relevant and
procedure-specic variables (number of operations performed, rate of unplanned readmissions, average waiting times, and
average time spent in hospital), interspersed with numerous hospital-wide clinical outcome measures (such as MRSA cases
 an indicator of hospital cleanliness  and 30-day mortality rates), as well as a thicket of clinically irrelevant variables.
Arguably, the presence of these clinically irrelevant details was harmful for two reasons. First, it distracted prospective
patientsattention away from clinically relevant information. Secondly, it potentially encouraged hospitals to seek to attract
patients by improving the quality of their food, or their number of parking spaces, rather than by improving (and possibly
at the expense of) quality of care.
9An alternative and complementary approach to that adopted in this paper would be to examine the impact of the
patient choice reforms by continuing to use mortality as an outcome measure, but focusing on the relatively limited number
of elective surgical procedures for which there is a non-trivial risk of death. For example, Aylin et al. (2013) study ve
elective surgical procedures that each have mortality rates of between 2 per cent and 3.6 per cent. Mortality rates from these
procedures could perhaps be used to study the impact of the patient choice reforms on elective surgery quality. However,
one impediment to such a study is that many elective surgical procedures with high mortality rates are performed at only
a small number of specialised hospitals, making it di¢ cult to obtain statistically signicant estimates. Moreover, even if
such a research project were feasible, there would still be a strong case for examining the impact of hospital competition on
elective surgery quality using alternative outcome measures that capture clinical quality in relation to the large majority
of elective surgical procedures for which death is a rare occurrence.
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2.2 Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs)
PROMs are measures of health status or health-related quality of life, as reported by patients. They
capture health status at a single point in time, the idea being to capture the outcome of a health
intervention by surveying patients twice: before the intervention, and after the intervention. The change
in health status is then taken as a measure of health gain from the intervention. While PROMs have long
been used by clinicians to improve their treatment of individual ailments, only recently have policymakers
recognised their potential for use in policy evaluation and performance measurement.10
In April 2009, the English NHS, after conducting a pilot programme (Smith et al. 2005; Browne et al.
2007), started collecting PROMs for four surgical procedures hip replacement, knee replacement, groin
hernia repair, and varicose vein treatment. Patients are given the generic EQ-5D survey of health-related
quality of life (EuroQol Group 1990) at their pre-surgical assessment or on admission for surgery, and
again either three or six months post-operatively (depending on the procedure undertaken). At the
same time, patients for all but one of the procedures are given a procedure-specic survey either the
Oxford Hip Score (OHS), the Oxford Knee Score (OKS), or the Aberdeen Varicose Veins Questionnaire
(AVVQ). Although completing the surveys is voluntary, it is believed that this is the worlds rst example
of nationwide administrative distribution and collection of a PROM for any surgical procedure.
The EQ-5D survey is very widely used in the UK and Europe. The National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence (NICE), which approves new medicines and devices for use within the English
and Welsh NHS, states that the EQ-5D is the preferred measure of health-related quality of life in
adultswhen conducting economic evaluation of health technologies (NICE 2013). The EQ-5D has two
components. The rst, the EQ-5D Visual Analogue Score (henceforth EQ-VAS), asks patients how
good or bad [their] health is today, on a scale of 0 (worst) to 100 (best). The second and more
important component, the EQ-5D prole index score (henceforth EQ-5D), asks patients to indicate their
current health status in ve dimensions mobility, ability to undertake self-care, ability to undertake
usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression. In each dimension, patients choose from three
options  1 (no problems), 2 (some problems), or 3 (extreme problems)  giving 35 = 243 possible
permutations of response.11 These 243 possible response proles are then aggregated with weights
obtained from population-level surveys, generating a single-dimensional measure of health-related quality
of life, with 1 representing perfect health and 0 representing death.12 The resulting measure can be
interpreted cardinally for example, a health state value of 0.07 means that 1 year lived in that state is
equivalent to 0.07 of a year in perfect health.
The OHS, OKS and AVVQ, which ask procedure-specic questions, generally have a greater capacity
than the EQ-5D to detect changes in health status resulting from surgery.13 The OHS and OKS comprise
12 multiple-choice questions which confer between 0 and 4 points each, yielding an overall score between
0 (worst) and 48 (best).14 The AVVQ comprises 13 multiple-choice questions which confer a certain
number of points each, yielding an overall score between 0 (best) and 100 (worst).15 In this paper, the
10PROMs are sometimes criticised on the grounds that, unlike objectivemeasures of health status, they are based on
subjectiveassessments by patients of how they are feeling. These assessments, it is sometimes argued, are not reliable, as
they are subject to a range of psychological and cognitive biases. However, the incorporation of subjective health states
into PROMs is not an undesirable epiphenomenon but is rather intrinsic to their very purpose, as PROMs are premised
on the recognition that many individual symptoms of illness (e.g. amount of pain) are best assessed by the patient.
11A newer version of the EQ-5D, the EQ-5D-5L, allows patients to choose between ve levels of health status in each
dimension (Herdman et al. 2011). However, the NHS PROMs programme continues to use the three-level version in the
questionnaires distributed to patients.
12Values below zero are possible, implying a health prole worse than death. The NHS uses EQ-5D utility weights based
on the Measuring and Valuing Health (MVH) study (NHS Digital 2016, p.37), a population-level survey of individuals
preferences concerning di¤erent dimensions of health (Dolan 1997). The MVH study surveyed 3,395 representative citizens
of England, Wales and Scotland to obtain valuations of 42 representative health proles using the time trade-o¤ method
that is, respondents were asked how many years of life in the state of perfect health (11111) they considered equivalent
to the prole in question. Valuations for the other 201 health proles were then interpolated from the valuations elicited
concerning these 42 health proles.
13For the procedure-specic PROMs studied in this paper, the weights for each question are determined by clinicians
rather than by surveying patients or citizens concerning their valuation of di¤erent health states. Consequently, the OHS,
OKS and AVVQ are best thought of not as measures of health-related quality of life as evaluated by patients or citizens,
but rather as clinically relevant measures of health gain from surgery.
14The original OHS and OKS score each question between 1 and 5, but for the NHS PROMs programme this is modied
to scores between 0 and 4 (NHS Digital 2016).
15Due to rounding of the weights used for each question, the maximum AVVQ score is actually 99.658 (NHS Digital
2016).
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scale of the AVVQ is reversed so that, like all other measures, higher scores denote better health. Table
2 reports summary statistics for all the outcome variables examined in this paper.
In 2016, the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) declared its intention to base
reimbursement decisions on PROMs-based measures of clinical quality, as part of its commitment to link
50 per cent of Medicare payments for primary care to quality or value by 2018 (CMS 2016). E¤orts
to incorporate PROMs into CMS reimbursement decisions have been informed by English experience
through a joint initiative between the NHS and the US Department of Health and Human Services
(HealthIT.gov 2016). The University of Oxford has allowed royalty-free use of the OHS and OKS to
participants in CMS quality reporting programs (HHS, CMS and Isis Innovation 2016), making it likely
that these PROMs, which are a central focus of this paper, will be at the heart of CMS e¤orts to measure
orthopaedic surgery quality for reimbursement.
The increasing international attention to PROMs can be understood as a response to the realisation
that existing measures of health care provider performance both fail to capture health outcomes for many
interventions, and are not robust to the inuence of consumer characteristics and actions on outcomes.
Grossmans seminal work on demand for health (Grossman 1972) posited that health care only confers
utility insofar as it contributes to health, a non-market good produced by households using endowments
and market goods, including health care. Two implications ow from this insight for performance
assessment of health care providers. The rst is that performance assessment should be based on the
amount of health produced, not on the amount of health care produced or in other words, on outcomes
rather than outputs. Initial attempts in the 1980s and 1990s to measure health outcomes tended to equate
health with the absence of sickness, focusing on outcomes such as mortality rates and readmission rates,
because these measures could often be derived from administrative data sets. However, failure-based
outcome measures of this kind convey only limited information, because, in most spheres of health
care, events such as death and readmissions are relatively rare, and therefore shed little light on the
great majority of health service interventions for most patients(Appleby and Devlin 2010, p.2; see also
Shojania & Forster 2008). Table 1 presents average mortality rates for the elective surgical procedures
studied in this paper, with mortality rates for AMI as comparator. All four elective procedures have
mortality rates of close to zero (or zero) yet, amongst the vast majority of patients who do not die
when undergoing these procedures, health outcomes vary greatly. Mortality-based indicators of hospital
performance do not directly capture this variation.16
By contrast, the EQ-5D, OHS, OKS and AVVQ have been extensively validated using standard
psychometric tests as tools for capturing health gains from the four NHS PROMs procedures (Smith et
al. 2005). Table 3 reports the e¤ect sizes  a measure of responsiveness to an intervention, equal to
average health gain divided by standard deviation of pre-operative score of the PROMs studied in this
paper. An e¤ect size of 0.2 is considered low, while 0.5 is considered moderate, and 0.8 is considered large
(Smith et al. 2005). The procedure-specic PROMs the OHS, OKS, and AVVQ have e¤ect sizes
ranging from 0.726 to 2.377. The EQ-5D index score performs very well for hip and knee replacement
surgery (0.954-1.271), but only moderately well for the other procedures (0.401-0.411). By contrast, the
EQ-VAS performs poorly in relation to all procedures other than hip replacement. Pooling all PROMs
procedures together yields an average e¤ect size of 0.890 for the EQ-5D index score and 0.212 for the
EQ-VAS. This paper designates all PROMs with large e¤ect sizes the procedure-specic PROMs and
the EQ-5D for hip and knee replacement, as well as for all PROMs procedures pooled together as its
main outcome variables of interest, and reports estimates using the other outcome variables in robustness
tests. Overall, these e¤ect sizes show that the PROMs collected by the English NHS contain meaningful
variation capable of detecting changes in health gain resulting from di¤erential exposure to competition.
A good outcome measure should be correlated with other validated outcome measures: a correlation
of 0.2 or above is taken as evidence of convergent (or concurrent) validity (Smith et al. 2005). One can
get a sense of the convergent validity of each PROM by checking how closely correlated it is with other
PROMs for that procedure. Table 4 shows that, with one exception, all such correlations are above
0.2. There is a particularly strong correlation between the EQ-5D and the Oxford Hip and Knee Scores.
16While it is possible that mortality rates are correlated with other negative outcomes for the larger subset of elective
surgery patients who do not die, the very low mortality rates reported in Table 1 suggest that, for these procedures,
mortality is unlikely to e¤ectively signal quality at conventional levels of statistical signicance.
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These correlations provide evidence that the PROMs studied in this paper are capturing a coherent,
underlying concept of health gain from surgery.17
The second implication of the Grossman model for health care provider performance measurement
is that it must engage with the challenge of casemix adjustment, in order to strip out the confounding
e¤ect of patient characteristics and actions on outcomes. The fact that PROMs base health outcomes
on the change in health status resulting from treatment makes them value-addedmeasures of health
outcomes akin to those increasingly used to evaluate school outcomes in the USA and UK (Kane &
Staiger 2008; Rothstein 2010; Chetty et al. 2014; Gibbons et al. 2013a; 2013b). The idea underlying
the value-added approach is that the baseline (pre-treatment health status or past exam results) can be
used as a su¢ cient statistic for aspects of prior health or learning that a¤ect current outcomes (Koedel
et al. 2015). The pre-treatment PROMs questionnaire thus greatly assists the challenge of disentangling
the hospitals contribution to post-treatment health status from the inuence of patient characteristics
and behaviour.
3 Evidence on within-hospital correlation in quality levels
If hospital mortality rates were correlated with average health gain from elective surgery, then there would
be little reason to re-examine the 2006 patient choice reforms using elective-surgery-specic outcome
measures, as the existing literature (Cooper et al. 2011; Gaynor et al. 2013; Bloom et al. 2015),
by measuring the impact of hospital competition using mortality-based quality indicators, would have
e¤ectively also been capturing the impact on elective surgery quality. If, on the other hand, these two
dimensions of hospital performance are uncorrelated or weakly correlated, there is a case for looking
again at the introduction of patient choice using outcome measures specic to the area of the hospital
that was directly a¤ected by this reform namely elective surgery (Bevan and Skellern 2011). To this
end, this section presents evidence on the relationship between elective surgery quality, as measured by
EQ-5D health gains, and various mortality-based indicators of hospital performance.
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the relationship between hospital trusts18 casemix-adjusted mortality
ratios and average casemix-adjusted PROMs health gains from elective surgery.19 Table 5 reports the
corresponding correlations for both raw (unadjusted) and risk-adjusted PROMs health gains. There
appears to be a small positive correlation between hospital trustsstandardised mortality rates (SHM)
and unadjusted PROMs health gains for orthopaedic surgery. When casemix-adjusted PROMs health
gains are used, this correlation is largely eliminated, but there is now a positive correlation between
trusts SHM and average PROMs health gains for varicose vein stripping, which can also be seen in
Figure 1. Bivariate regressions of the log of trusts standardised mortality ratio on the log of trusts
average EQ-5D health gains, reported in Table A4, conrms the overall picture there is no evidence
that hospital performance in relation to mortality is positively correlated with performance in relation
to health gains from elective surgery, and indeed there is some evidence that performance in these two
dimensions is negatively correlated.
I next present data on the relationship between PROMs health gains and AMI mortality at the
hospital site level.20 Whereas there are questions about the capacity of standardised mortality indicators
17There is no relationship between hospital mortality rates for the PROMs procedures and average adjusted PROMs
health gains. This is because death is an extremely rare outcome for all four PROMs procedures.
18 In the English NHS, hospital trusts are administrative and nancial entities that may include a number of di¤erent
hospital sites. Most of the analysis in this paper is conducted at the level of individual hospital sites. However, standardised
mortality rates are analysed at the trust level, because this is the level at which these data are published.
19From 2010/11 onwards, my measure of risk-adjusted hospital mortality is the o¢ cial NHS Summary Hospital Mortality
Indicator or SHMI (HSCIC 2013). For 2009/10, before the SHMI was created, I use the Hospital Standardised Mortality
Ratios (HSMR) published by Dr Foster (Dr Foster 2011), divided by 100 to make its scale comparable with the SHMI.
Although the HSMR and SHMI are calculated in di¤erent ways, they produce similar outputs, namely a number, generally
ranging between 0.7 and 1.2 (or 70 and 120), which reports the ratio of actual to expected deaths, with a value lower than
one indicating fewer deaths than expected, and a value greater than one indicating more deaths than expected. When
reporting correlations with trust -level Standardised Mortality Rates, I use o¢ cial NHS average (adjusted and unadjusted)
trust-level PROMs health gains. By contrast, average adjusted and unadjusted PROMs health gains at the hospital site
level are calculated by the author from patient-level data. The patient-level casemix adjustment strategy is outlined in
Appendix 1.
20Following Cooper et al. (2011), to maximise comparability between hospitals the sample of AMI patients is restricted to
include only patients aged between 39 and 100 that were admitted to hospital on an emergency basis from their permanent
or temporary place of residence. To avoid possible bias due to upcoding of diagnoses, patients discharged alive with a total
length of stay of less than three days are discarded.
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to meaningfully capture di¤erences in care quality (Black 2010; Lilford & Pronovost 2010), there is a clear
and well-documented link between AMI survival rates and the quality and timeliness of care (Bradley
et al. 2006; Jha et al. 2007). Thus, if the qualities of di¤erent treatments within a given hospital are
correlated with each other, there should be a negative correlation between AMI mortality and adjusted
PROMs health gains. Figure 2 presents scatter plots of hospital sitesAMI mortality rates and adjusted
PROMs health gains. Table 6 reports the corresponding correlations for both raw and risk-adjusted
PROMs health gains. There appears to be no relationship between the quality of a hospitals elective
surgery and its AMI mortality rate. Simple bivariate regressions of the log of hospitalsAMI mortality
on the log of average EQ-5D health gain, reported in Table A5, show no signicant relationships.
Even if there is little or no cross-sectional relationship between a hospitals mortality rates and elective
surgical quality as captured by PROMs health gains, such a relationship may exist in rst di¤erences for
example, quality improvements in one section of the hospital may be transmitted to other sections of the
hospital, even if some sections o¤er high quality care while others o¤er low quality care. To investigate
this hypothesis, Table 7 presents correlations between hospital trustsyear-on-year change in average
risk-adjusted PROMs health gains and change in standardised mortality rates, while Table 8 presents
correlations between hospital sitesyear-on-year change in adjusted PROMs health gains and change in
AMI mortality.21 Neither table indicates the hypothesised negative correlation between rst di¤erenced
mortality rates and rst di¤erenced adjusted PROMs health gains, and simple bivariate regressions in
logs, reported in Tables A6 and A7, conrm no statistically signicant relationships at the 5 per cent
level.22
The apparent lack of any negative relationship between hospital mortality rates and average PROMs
health gains either cross-sectionally or in rst di¤erences highlights the importance of moving beyond
an exclusive focus on mortality-based outcome measures when assessing the impact of changes to hospital
incentive structures on hospital productivity and clinical quality. It is, moreover, consistent with the
nding of inspections of clinical governance in the English NHS in the early 2000s by the Commission
for Health Improvement, a predecessor of the Care Quality Commission, that no large acute hospital
performed well across the boardthey typically had a mix of good and poor services, often with a
dysfunctional clinical team(Bevan & Cornwell 2006, p.359).23 While some might be tempted to explain
this lack of relationship by arguing that PROMs health gains are just random noise, such a dismissal
would be unconvincing given the evidence presented in Section 2.2 that the PROMs data does capture
meaningful variation in health gain from elective surgery. Of course, preventing patient death will always
be a key indicator of hospital performance but Section 3s ndings suggest that mortality rates capture
just one dimension of quality, and that focusing on them to the exclusion of other dimensions can provide
an incomplete picture, especially when the changes being studied target a section of the hospital where
mortality is a rare event.
4 Multi-good models of hospital competition with xed prices
This section presents a theoretical framework to motivate this papers examination of the 2006 English
patient choice reforms using elective-surgery-specic outcome measures. Standard economic models
of hospital competition with xed prices (Gaynor 2006; Gaynor & Town 2012) assume that hospitals
produce a single type of output and choose a single, vertical quality level. These models predict that,
so long as the regulated price exceeds the marginal cost with respect to quantity, increased competition
intensity will lead to higher hospital quality. This section extends this standard model to a setting where
a given hospital j produces two types of output elective surgery (x = 1) and emergency care (x = 2)
21This paper conducts its analysis at the nancial year level. The UK nancial year runs from 5 April until 4 April. For
the purpose of this paper, I dene a nancial year as running from 1 April until 31 March. All references to years in this
paper refer to nancial years.
22For brevity, I do not present graphical evidence of the relationship between rst-di¤erenced mortality rates and
rst-di¤erenced PROMs health gains, nor do I present correlations between rst-di¤erenced mortality and rst-di¤erenced
unadjusted PROMs health gains. The graphs indicate that there is no relationship between these variables in rst
di¤erences, while the unadjusted correlations show a qualitatively similar picture to the adjusted correlations.
23This evidence is also consistent with the ndings of the New York Cardiac Surgery Reporting System, which showed
that there were substantial di¤erences in mortality rates between individual surgeons at the same hospital (Chassin 2002). If
outcomes can vary so substantially within a given hospital department, then it seems clear that outcomes between hospital
departments cannot necessarily be assumed to be correlated.
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with associated quality levels zj1 and zj2.24 Elective surgery is assumed to be subject to competition,
while emergency care is not. The model initially assumes that quality of both elective surgery and
emergency care is observable (as captured, for example, by PROMs health gains and mortality rates
respectively). In light of the fact that PROMs health gains from elective surgery were not reported on
the NHS Choices website doing the period of study, it then considers what happens if quality of elective
surgery is unobservable.
Prices for each output type, p1 and p2, are xed and paid by the government. The demand experienced
by hospital j for output x, qjx, is equal to market share sjx multiplied by overall market demand Dx:
qjx = sjxDx. As NHS patients do not face any of the costs associated with hospitalisation, market shares,
as well as overall market demand for each good, are independent of prices; overall market demand is a
function only of exogenous demand shifters x (e.g. illness): Dx = Dx (x).
For elective surgery, market share sj1(zj1; z j1; N) is a function of the number of hospitals in the
market N , own electives quality zj1, and the vector of electives quality of all other hospitals z j1, with
@sj1
@zj1
> 0, @sj1@zk1  0 8k 6= j, and
@sj1
@N < 0. That is, electives market share is increasing in own electives
quality, weakly decreasing in electives quality of all other hospitals, and decreasing in the number of
competitors. Increased hospital competition is represented in the model as an increase in N .25 Crucially,
it is also assumed that @
2sj1
@zj1@N
> 0  the sensitivity of market share to own quality is increasing in
the number of competitors. Emergency patients are assumed to simply attend the nearest appropriate
hospital, so demand is not a function of emergency care quality: qj2 = sj2D2(2) .
The two output types interact via the cost structure: the cost of producing each output type is
dependent not only on the quality of that output type, but also on the quality of the other output type.
In this way, the model aims to capture possible complementarities and substitutabilities between output
types in production. Total cost of producing output type x is cjx = cx(qjx; zjx; zj; x;Wx) + Fx, where
Wx denotes exogenous cost shifters and Fx denotes xed costs. If @cx@z x < 0 and
@2cx
@zx@z x
< 0, the output
types are cost complements or in other words, there are economies of scope between the two output
types. If @cx@z x > 0 and
@2cx
@zx@z x
> 0, the output types are cost substitutes, or in other words, there are
diseconomies of scope.26
NHS hospitals are not prot-maximisers, but do have an incentive to generate operating surpluses
(that is, prots), or at least not to run decits.27 In addition, hospital managers are assumed to value
the provision of quality in its own right, whether for altruistic or other (e.g. reputational) reasons,
and are therefore assumed to maximise some combination of prots and quality Uj = u(j ; zj1,zj2).
For simplicity, managerial utility is assumed to be additively separable in all arguments, so Uj = j +
v1(zj1) + v2(zj2). The hospitals problem is therefore:
max
zj1;zj2
Uj = p1[sj1(zj1; z j1; N)D1(1)] + p2[sj2D2(2)] +
2X
x=1
[vx(zjx)  c(qjx; zjx; zj; x;W )  Fx]
24The model presented here is an extension of that presented in Gaynor et al. (2011), which includes two output types
but assumes that the hospital chooses a single level of quality that is common to both output types.
25The main reason for representing the increase in competition resulting from the patient choice reforms as an increase
in N is that moving from the previous regime of selective contracting, in which a patients choices are restricted to the
hospitals with whom their care purchaser maintains a bulk contract, to free patient choice of hospital, involves an expansion
in patients choice sets, even if no new providers actually enter the market. Additionally, new provider entry did occur
alongside the patient choice reforms, as a consequence of the establishment of privately owned and managed specialty
surgical centres (Independent Sector Treatment Centres) for the provision of routine diagnostic procedures and treatments
(Cooper et al. 2016).
26For example, consider c1 = q1(z21 + z1z2), so
@c1
@z2
= q1z1 and
@2c1
@z1@z2
= q1. If  is positive, the output types are
cost substitutes; if  is negative, they are cost complements. There does not seem to be any reason, ex ante, to assume
that hospital outputs are more likely to be cost substitutes or cost complements  one can easily think of reasons why
both types of relationship might arise. For example, hospital outputs might be cost complements because innovations in
one part of the hospital can be translated to other parts of the hospital. Alternatively, hospital outputs might be cost
substitutes because of limited managerial attention, so that quality increases in one part of the hospital can only come at
the expense of quality in other parts of the hospital.
27Hospitals with Foundation Trust (FT) status could retain any surplus generated within a nancial year for investment as
they saw t; operating surpluses therefore enabled them to nance whatever other objectives they may have had. Hospitals
without FT status could not retain surpluses, but were assessed for FT status in part on their nancial performance, so
they too had an incentive to run surpluses, or at least to avoid decits.
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Dropping the j subscripts, the hospitals two rst order conditions (FOC) are:
z1 (electives care quality):
h
p1   @c1@q1
i
@s1(z

1 )
@z1
D1(1) +
@v1(z

1 )
@z1
=
@c1(z

1 ;z

2 )
@z1
+
@c2(z

1 ;z

2 )
@z1
z2 (emergency care quality):
@v2(z

2 )
@z2
=
@c1(z

1 ;z

2 )
@z2
+
@c2(z

1 ;z

2 )
@z2
(1)
In the rst FOC, the left hand side denotes the marginal benet of providing elective surgery quality
the rst term is the marginal monetary benet, which is proportional to the gap between the regulated
price and marginal cost, while the second term is the marginal altruistic benet. The right hand side
denotes the marginal cost of providing elective surgery quality. The rst FOC implies that, subject to
p1 greater than marginal cost, an increase in competition (increase in N) leads to unambiguously higher
elective surgery quality by increasing the sensitivity of market share to electives quality (@
2s1(z

1 )
@z1@N
> 0).
The e¤ect of increased competition on emergency care quality, however, is not so clear-cut. The second
FOC, for emergency care quality, shows that, if the two types of output are cost complements ( @
2c1
@z1@z2
< 0:
economies of scope), the increase in elective surgery quality reduces marginal costs, implying an increase
in z2. If, on the other hand, the two output types are cost substitutes ( @
2c1
@z1@z2
> 0: diseconomies of
scope), the increase in z1 leads to higher marginal costs, implying a decrease in z2. Thus, increased
competition leads to higher emergency care quality if the two outputs are cost complements, but lower
emergency care quality if the two outputs are cost substitutes.28
One way of interpreting the studies of the English patient choice reforms focused on mortality-based
quality indicators (Cooper et al. 2011; Gaynor et al. 2013; Bloom et al. 2015) is that increased
competition led to higher emergency care quality, as this is where a large percentage of hospital deaths
occur. On this interpretation, the rst order conditions just presented imply that elective surgery and
emergency care must be cost complements, as quality in elective surgery should have unambiguously
increased. However, the model on which these rst order conditions are based assumes that the quality
of both output types is observable. If the quality of elective surgery is unobservable as was arguably
the case during the period under consideration, given that PROMs health gains were not published on
the NHS Choices website  then it cannot inuence electives demand. In other words, @sj1@zk1 = 0 8k.
In this case, competition will have no impact on the quality of either output, as it leads to rst order
conditions in which the quality of both outputs is set by simply equating the marginal altruistic benet
of quality with the marginal cost:
@vx(z

x)
@zx
=
@cx(z

x;z

 x)
@zx
+
@c x(z x;z

x)
@zx
8x = 1; 2 (2)
If, in addition to elective surgery quality being unobservable, patients (rightly or wrongly) take
emergency care quality as a proxy for elective care quality for example, because when they go to the
NHS Choices website to learn about options for their elective surgery procedure, hospital standardised
mortality rates are listed as one of the bases for comparison  then the model should be modied to
assume that @sj1@zk1 = 0 8k,
@sj1
@zj2
> 0, @sj1@zk2  0 8k 6= j, and
@2sj1
@zj2@N
> 0. That is, electives market share is
unresponsive to own elective surgery quality, increasing in own emergency care quality, weakly decreasing
in emergency care quality of all other hospitals, and more responsive to own emergency care quality when
competition intensity (N) is higher. The rst order conditions for the hospitals optimisation problem
are now:
z1 (electives care quality):
@v1(z

1 )
@z1
=
@c1(z

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1 ;z
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@z1
z2 (emergency care quality):
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(3)
These rst order conditions imply that increasing competition in elective surgery leads to unambiguously
higher emergency care quality but, perversely, to lower elective surgery quality if there are diseconomies
28This result can be understood as an application of the Holmstrom-Milgrom (1991) multi-tasking model. Instead of z2
being unobservable, as in the Holmstrom-Milgrom model, the problem is that it is not possible to incentivise improvements
in z2 because demand for emergency care is inelastic (patients are simply sent to the closest appropriate hospital). As in
the Holmstrom-Milgrom setting, the inability to incentivise z2 means that only incentivising z1 will have a negative e¤ect
on z2 if the two activities are cost substitutes. The essential message of this model, for the purpose of empirical studies
of hospital competition of quality, is that assuming ex ante that the quality of emergency care which can reasonably be
captured by a hospitals total or AMI mortality rate  is either identical to, or a proxy for, the quality of elective surgery
elides potentially important issues concerning the interaction between production of di¤erent hospital outputs.
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of scope (i.e. if the two types of hospital output are cost substitutes).29 Recent empirical evidence
suggests that there are in fact diseconomies of scope between emergency and elective care in English
NHS hospitals (Freeman et al. 2016).30 These recent ndings provide a further argument in support
of looking at the e¤ect of the 2006 patient choice reforms on elective-surgery-specic quality measures,
rather than assuming ex ante that any changes to mortality-based performance indicators resulting from
competition will also have occurred in relation to elective surgery.
5 Identication strategy and data
5.1 Regression specication
The English NHS has collected PROMs since April 2009, while patient choice of hospital for elective
surgery dates from 2006. It is not therefore possible to estimate the e¤ect of patient choice on PROMs
using the a DiD-style methods of Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013). Cross-sectional variation
in treatment intensity does exist, however, because the strength of competition to which a hospital is
exposed varies geographically the reform had a greater impact on hospitals that had many competitors
in their nearby vicinity than on hospitals with few competitors in their nearby vicinity, because it is easier
for patients of the former to switch to an alternative hospital. This paper identies the e¤ect of hospital
competition on care quality using this cross-sectional variation, by running the following regression for
patient i undertaking procedure p31 at hospital site j32 and year t:
gain ijpt = 0 + 1 comp jt + 2 cases jpt + 3 cases
2
jpt + 4 admissions jt + 5 admissions
2
jt
+06Xijpt + 
0
7Y jt + 
0
8Zj + uijpt
(4)
The left hand side variable is (casemix-adjusted) health gain from surgery as captured by PROMs,
while compjt is the competition intensity experienced by hospital j at time t, casesjpt is the number of
cases for that hospital site-procedure-year, admissionsjt is total annual admissions per trust, and uijpt is
an error term.33 Xijpt denotes a vector of patient-level controls, Y jt denotes time-varying hospital-level
controls, and Zj denotes time-invariant hospital level controls; the contents of these vectors are dened
in Section 5.5. All regressions cluster standard errors at the hospital level.
The coe¢ cient of interest is 1, the e¤ect of competition intensity on casemix-adjusted health gain
from surgery. Actual competition intensity between hospitals cannot be measured; consequently, all
measures of competition intensity are measures of market structure, or of the potential for competition.
This paper measures competition using the (negative log) Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which
is equal to the sum of squared market shares of each competitor in the market.34 A separate HHI is
calculated for each nancial year for each of six high-volume elective surgical procedures: the four PROMs
procedures, plus knee arthroscopy and cataract repair, using a denition of market size that is discussed
29 It is important to be clear that this hypothesis of the model just presented is not consistent with rational expectations,
which imply that patients should not choose which hospital to attend for elective surgery on the basis of emergency care
quality if the latter has a negative relationship with elective surgery quality. Nonetheless, the hypothesis is plausible given
the range of information available to elective surgery patients on the NHS Choices website during the study period.
30Freeman et al. (2016) study the relationship between emergency and elective care costs and volumes, nding that
increased elective surgery volumes are associated with an increase in emergency care costs. While Freeman et al. only
look at cost-quantity relationships, their ndings suggest that there may also be diseconomies of scope between these two
output types in relation to vertical product quality.
31Hip and knee replacement observations (including both primary procedures and revisions) are analysed together because
they are all performed by a hospitals orthopaedic department. In all orthopaedic surgery regressions, a dummy variable
for knee replacement is included, as are separate dummy variables for revisions to hip and knee replacements, to capture
level di¤erences in health gains between these four surgical procedures. Estimates from running regressions separately for
hip and knee replacement are reported in Table 15.
32NHS hospital trusts often consist of multiple hospital sites which can be located up to 100km from each other.
Although nances are managed at the trust level, individual hospital sites within a hospital trust are for many purposes run
independently, and can act as e¤ective competitors with each other. For this reason, analysis is conducted at the hospital
site level rather than trust level. Unlike the HES trust code eld, which is always complete, the site code eld is missing
in approximately 10 percent of cases, and contains invalid data in approximately 10 percent more. In the vast majority of
such cases, however, it is possible to impute the correct site codes with certainty, for example when only one site within a
trust performs a given procedure. In the small number of remaining cases around 4.4 percent site codes are randomly
imputed from a list of all sites in a trust that perform the procedure in question.
33Total and procedure-specic hospital admissions may be inuenced by hospital quality after the introduction of patient
choice; this issue is discussed in Section 5.3.
34Logs are taken to capture the idea that treatment e¤ects will be constant with respect to percentage changes in
competition intensity; the scale is reversed so that a higher value of compjt denotes higher competition intensity.
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below. An overall HHI for each hospital and nancial year is then created by taking a weighted average
of the procedure-specic HHIs. Although treatment intensity is equated with a nancial-year-specic
HHI, for reasons discussed below, in our main specication we instrument this current-period HHI by
the average value of the HHI in the three nancial years leading up to the introduction of patient choice
of hospital (2002/3 to 2004/5).
The most worrisome potential sources of endogeneity when estimating the e¤ect of hospital competition
on care quality fall under two broad headings. The rst is endogeneity caused by patient choice
behaviour, and encompasses selection bias (in which choice of hospital is driven by unobservable patient
characteristics that inuence outcomes) and reverse causality (in which patient choices inuence ones
measure of competition intensity). The second is omitted variable bias due to unobserved geographical
correlates of competition intensity. The next section outlines how I use instrumental variables to address
bias arising from patient choices. After that, I show how value-added measures of health outcomes
control for the most worrisome geographical correlate of competition namely patient health status.
5.2 Instruments for competition to address endogeneity due to patient choice
behaviour
When patients choose a hospital, their choices may be systematically inuenced by patient-level
characteristics that inuence outcomes. If sicker patients select disproportionately into attending higher-
quality hospitals because they have more at stake from surgery, and if quality is equated with post-
treatment health status, then the observed distribution of hospital quality will be compressed or reversed
relative to the true distribution. For example, Great Ormond Street Hospital has one of the highest child
mortality rates of any hospital in England, but this is because the sickest children are sent there, not
because it is a poor quality hospital. While the sign of this selection bias is not so clear cut when
value-added outcome measures are used, it is nonetheless a signicant potential source of endogeneity.35
As well as leading to selection bias, patientschoices can also lead to reverse causality as a result of
the way in which competition intensity is calculated. The primary methodological challenge in measuring
competition intensity is how to dene the size of the market within which a given hospital operates. A
common approach is to centre markets on hospitals and to assume that hospital js market includes all
hospitals within the radius required to encompass the home address of a certain percentage (e.g. 95%)
of js patients. The problem with these variable radiusmethods is that, when patients can choose
which hospital they attend, percentiles of patient distance travelled will in general be endogenous to
hospital quality. For example, a high quality hospital may attract patients from farther aeld, thus
giving it a larger market radius, and making it appear more competitive.36 This is an example of reverse
causality, as the objective is to estimate the causal e¤ect of competition intensity on hospital quality,
but hospital quality is now inuencing (ones denition of) competition intensity; estimates of the e¤ect
of competition on quality using standard regression methods will therefore be biased.
This paper uses three di¤erent strategies to address these dual sources of endogeneity arising from
the e¤ect of patient choices. Firstly, to ameliorate the problem of reverse causality arising from hospital-
centred denitions of market size, this papers main measures of competition intensity instead centre
hospital markets on patientsneighbourhoods of residence. A patients neighbourhood is dened as their
Middle Super Output Area (MSOA), a geographical statistical unit that usually contains between 6,000
and 9,000 residents.37 Competition measures centred on an exogenously dened neighbourhoodwill
still be inuenced by patient choices, but are less subject to bias due to reverse causality because it is
hard to think of reasons why the direction of any such inuence would be systematic, as it likely would
be with a variable radius denition of market size.
35This problem of selection bias can be understood as a form of omitted variable bias because, if all relevant patient
characteristics could were observable, the problem could be eliminated by controlling for these patient characteristics in
ones regressions.
36The bias could, in theory, run in either direction. A counter-example would be a hospital o¤ering such high quality
of care that all patients living nearby attend the hospital, resulting in a very small market size when measured using
percentiles of patient distance travelled. While the example is perhaps far-fetched in relation to hospital markets, this
is exactly what happens in many British state schools, where places are allocated on the basis of distance from home to
school.
37England had 6,791 MSOAs in 2011. MSOA boundaries are kept as stable as possible, but are redened as required to
keep MSOA populations between 5,000 and 15,000.
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Secondly, to further address reverse causality, this paper instruments its current-period measure of
market structure with the average value of market structure for the three years preceding the introduction
of patient choice, 2002/3 to 2004/5.38 As patients could not choose which hospital they attended during
these years, instrumenting the HHI with its average pre-reform level should address any concerns that
competition intensity is partly a function of hospital quality.
Thirdly, to address selection bias, I use a conditional logit model (Kessler & McClellan 2000; Gaynor
et al. 2013) to predict patient choice of hospital on the basis of exogenous variables, and calculate the
HHI using these predicted patient choices, rather than actual patient choices. Let patient is utility
from prospective hospital j be an additive function of a systematic component 0jxi + 
0zij and a
random component "ij . The vector xi with hospital-specic coe¢ cients j contains individual-specic
explanatory variables, while the vector zij with coe¢ cients  denotes hospital-level or patient-level
variables that are a function of choice of hospital.
Uij = 
0
jxi + 
0zij + "ij
The probability that i will choose j, ij , is the probability that j is the utility maximising choice of
hospital:
ij = Pr(Hi = j) = Pr (maxfUi1; Ui2; : : : ; UiJg = Uij)
If it is assumed that "ij is distributed standard Type 1 extreme value with cumulative distribution
function F (") = exp (  exp ( ")), then it can be shown (Maddala 1983; for further details, see Appendix
2) that:
ij =
exp(0jxi + 
0zij)PJ
=1 exp
 
0jxi + 0zij

The parameters of the model are estimated by maximum likelihood separately for each surgical
procedure and nancial year in the dataset. For each patient, the model gives a probability of attendance
at each hospital. These probabilities, which sum to 1 for each individual, are used to calculate predicted
market shares in each MSOA for each hospital. To calculate this competition index, for each of
the six elective surgical procedure listed above, I rst calculate a procedure-MSOA-year-level HHI
equal to the sum of each providers predicted squared market shares in the MSOA. I then create a
procedure-hospital-year-level HHI equal to the weighted average of the HHIs of all the MSOAs that it
serves, and nally a single HHI for each hospital and year as a weighted average of the procedure-specic
HHIs.
HHIs based on predicted patient choices are essentially a complex form of instrumentation, in which
instead of instrumenting competition intensity itself, each patients choice of hospital is instrumented,
and the resulting predicted patient choices are then used as inputs into the construction of competition
indices.39 This approach eliminates any inuence of hospital quality on patient decisions, thus
comprehensively addressing the problem of selection bias, as well as addressing any residual concerns
about reverse causality.
Patient distance to hospital is a critical variable in predicted patient choice models for two reasons.
The rst is that, as patients generally bear some or all of the travel costs incurred when obtaining
treatment, a patients distance to a given hospital is the biggest predictor of whether they will attend
that hospital. This study species a choice model in which a patients utility from attending a given
hospital is not only a function of distance to that hospital, but is also a function of the di¤erence between
38As patients could not choose which hospital they attended, a HHI calculated during these years is best understood as
a measure of market structure or alternatively, of the potential for competition rather than of the intensity of actually
operative competition.
39Given the complex functional form of this instrument, it must be estimated in two separate stages. The rst stage
estimates patient choices on the basis of exogenous variables, and constructs competition indices on the basis of these
choices, while the second regresses hospital quality on our measure of competition intensity constructed using predicted
patient choices. Performing instrumental variables estimation in two separate stages will lead to incorrect standard errors
in the second stage, as the standard errors from the rst stage regression are not taken into account. Gaynor et al. (2013)
investigate the severity of this problem in relation to HHI indices based on predicted patient choices by generating ten
bootstrap samples of hospital admissions from their dataset and constructing HHIs for each sample. They nd that the
correlation between hospitalspredicted HHIs across samples was above 0.99, suggesting that there is little need to account
for sampling variation in the rst stage. They argue that this result arises from the large number of observations used to
construct predicted HHIs.
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distance to that hospital and distance to the next closest alternative hospital, based on a number of
hospital characteristics. The second reason for this variables importance is that it is used to satisfy the
exclusion restriction. That is, it is assumed that distance to hospital does not a¤ect outcomes except via
its e¤ect on choice of hospital and therefore competition. Given that all the other predictors of patient
choice included in the conditional logit model, such as patient characteristics, are included in the second
stage regression of competition on outcomes, distance to hospital, and derivatives of this variable, are
therefore the primary means by which regressions identify the causal e¤ect of competition on clinical
quality using HHIs constructed from predicted patient choices.
The exclusion restriction could be violated for two reasons. First, very sick patients could move house
in order to live close to a hospital, in which case distance to hospital would predict health outcomes. While
this phenomenon likely occurs to some limited extent, it is unlikely to bias the measures of competition
intensity used in this paper, because patients who move house in order to live near a hospital (for
example, patients with terminal cancer, or patients with kidney disease who require regular dialysis) are
likely to be so sick that they are ineligible to undergo the elective surgical procedures covered by the
PROMs programme.
Secondly, and more problematically, patient distance to hospital will be correlated with urbanness
and therefore (potentially) with competition intensity, so whether the exclusion restriction is satised
will depend on whether the correlates of urbanness which a¤ect outcomes (such as poverty and health
status) are satisfactorily controlled for by other means. In other words, HHIs based on predicted patient
choices do not solve the problem of omitted variable bias due to the unobserved correlates of geography.
This problem is the focus of the next section.
5.3 Value-added measures to address the correlates of geography
This paper identies the causal e¤ect of hospital competition on care quality using cross-sectional
estimation, in which variation in competition intensity comes from the geographically-based nature of
hospital markets  yet there are many correlates of geography that may also inuence outcomes.40
These correlates of geography will lead to omitted variable bias if not adequately controlled for. In
England, inner-city residents tend to be poorer, and therefore also sicker, than their suburban and rural
counterparts. If competition intensity is also higher in inner-city areas, the resulting correlation between
competition intensity and health status will, if quality is equated with post-treatment health status, lead
to downward-biased estimates of the e¤ect of competition on quality. While this correlation between
patient health status and competition intensity is the most important potential geographically-driven
source of omitted variable bias, there are other potential sources of sources of geographically-driven
heterogeneity at the hospital level that may bias ones estimates.
The best practicesolution to the problem of the unobserved correlates of geography has, since Kessler
& McClellan (2000), been to include hospital xed e¤ects in ones model alongside a competition index
based on predicted patient choices. The within-hospital year-on-year variation in predicted patient choice
HHIs can, unlike equivalent variation from HHIs based on actual patient choices, theoretically be used to
identify the causal e¤ect of competition on quality in a model with hospital xed e¤ects.41 However, my
prior is that the four years covered by the PROMs data is unlikely to have provided su¢ cient time for any
exogenous drivers of competition to have generated su¢ cient within-hospital variation in competition
intensity to enable statistically signicant treatment e¤ects to be estimated. I report and discuss the
estimates from such a regression in the robustness tests.
While including hospital xed e¤ects is not possible in this study, it turns out that the use of a
value-added indicator of hospital performance (that is, equating hospital quality with health gain from
40The dataset used in this paper incorporates observations from four years, and the competition indices  as well as
any other hospital-level averages  used are calculated at year level. This means that there is, strictly speaking, some
within-hospital variation in competition intensity over time. However, as time-invariant instruments for competition are
also employed, and hospital xed e¤ects are not included in the regressions, the e¤ect of hospital competition on clinical
quality is e¤ectively being identied using only cross-sectional variation (notwithstanding that the tted values from the
rst stage might vary slightly within a given hospital from year to year).
41Whereas any within-hospital year-on-year variation using HHIs calculated from actual patient choices will be an
endogenous outcome of market participants behaviour, an HHI calculated using predicted patient choices is based only
on exogenous determinants of patient choice. Any within-hospital variation in an HHI based on predicted patient choices
(which could be driven by exogenous factors such as demographic changes driven by migration, or changes in preferences
concerning willingness to travel) should therefore, in theory, be able to identify a causal e¤ect.
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treatment rather than with post-treatment health status) provides an arguably even more powerful way
of controlling for the most important correlate of geography that inuences health outcomes, namely
pre-treatment patient health status. The primary rationale for including hospital xed e¤ects in ones
regressions is that there may be unobserved components of (pre-treatment) patient health status that
a¤ect outcomes. Hospital xed a¤ects are, in fact, not an ideal solution to this problem, as they do
not control for pre-treatment patient health status at the level of the individual patient, but rather only
control for any time-invariant features of average patient health status at a given hospital. PROMs, by
providing information about pre-treatment health status as well as post-treatment health status, allows
one to control directly for pre-treatment patient health status at the individual level, thus increasing
precision relative to the inclusion of a hospital xed e¤ect, as well as avoiding any bias due to changing
patient characteristics at the hospital level that can arise when hospital xed e¤ects are used.
The use of a value-added indicator of hospital performance eliminates the problem of classical casemix
bias, in which hospitals whose patients start out unobservably sicker have worse average health outcomes,
and therefore appear to o¤er lower quality care than is the case in reality. This problem is replaced with
another, more subtle source of potential bias if unobserved components of pre-treatment health status
are correlated with health gain from surgery. For example, if unobservably sicker patients have a higher
average health gain from surgery, then hospitals with unobservably sicker patients will appear to o¤er
higher quality care than is the case in reality.
Observably sicker patients will certainly have higher health gains from surgery as measured by PROMs
due to ceiling e¤ects arising from the bounded nature of PROMs scores a patient who reports close
to perfect health before treatment is incapable of experiencing large health gains from treatment as
captured by the PROMs surveys. However, by risk-adjusting health gains from surgery, and including
pre-treatment health status (and its quadratic) as explanatory variables in the risk adjustment regression,
this paper strips out this mechanical inuence of pre-treatment health status on outcomes.42 The
e¤ect of this risk-adjustment exercise is demonstrated in Figure 3, which shows, for hip replacement
patients, the relationship between pre-treatment health status and adjusted/unadjusted health gains.
Panels (A) and (C) show how unadjusted health gains from surgery are a mechanical function of
pre-treatment health status, while panels (B) and (D) show how the risk adjustment process eliminates
this relationship.43 The risk-adjustment of outcomes means that this paper is e¤ectively estimating
a kind of lagged-scorevalue-added model rather than a gain-scoremodel, because it allows for the
possibility that pre-treatment health status inuences post-treatment health status with a coe¢ cient
di¤erent to one.
This papers estimates will only be subject to casemix bias from the unobserved correlates of geography
if unobserved components of pre-treatment health status are correlated with health gains from surgery. In
other words, post-treatment health status must be inuenced by unobserved components of pre-treatment
health status. But pre-treatment health status is captured using a questionnaire identical to that used
to capture post-treatment health status. I therefore argue that the pre-treatment PROMs survey is a
su¢ cient statistic for aspects of pre-treatment health status relevant to post-treatment health status
as captured by PROMs. Therefore, estimating the e¤ect of market structure on hospital performance
using risk-adjusted PROMs health gains eliminates the problem of casemix bias due to the unobserved
correlates of geography.
42When publishing hospital-level PROMs scores, NHS Digital (and its predecessors, HSCIC and the NHS IC) provides
casemix-adjusted health gains from surgery, in addition to unadjusted outcomes. NHS Digital does not, however, perform
the same adjustment on patient level data. I therefore replicate the NHSs hospital-level casemix adjustment strategy, to
generate patient-level risk-adjusted post-treatment health status, and risk-adjusted health gain from surgery, for all survey
respondents who could be linked to HES. Appendix 1 outlines this casemix adjustment methodology, discusses associated
methodological questions, provides a list of the variables used, and reports coe¢ cient estimates from the risk adjustment
regressions.
43 It is a deliberate design feature of the o¢ cial NHS PROMs risk adjustment methodology that adjusted health gains
from surgery are not completely orthogonal to pre-treatment health status. If adjusted health gains were simply calculated
as a residual after stripping out the e¤ect of observables (including pre-treatment health status) then adjusted health
gains would be orthogonal to pre-treatment health status by construction. However, the NHS PROMs risk adjustment
methodology includes in the adjustment regression a hospital xed e¤ect (which can be thought of as capturing hospital
quality), and strips out only the e¤ect of observable patient characteristics on health gains over and above the component
of health gains that can be attributed to the hospital via the xed e¤ect. Therefore, adjusted health gains will continue
to be correlated with pre-treatment health status to the extent that pre-treatment health status is correlated with the
hospital xed e¤ects. This is a strength not a weakness of the risk adjustment methodology, as it allows for the possibility
that hospital quality, as captured by the hospital xed e¤ects, is empirically correlated with pre-treatment health status.
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While unobserved aspects of patient health status are the most signicant potential source of omitted
variable bias due to the geographical correlates of competition, there are other unobserved hospital-level
characteristics that are correlated with competition intensity and inuence outcomes. Inner-city hospitals
tend to be older and more prestigious than other hospitals  for example because they are teaching
hospitals, or connected to a university (and therefore involved in medical research). If these hospitals
attract better doctors, and if competition intensity is higher in inner-city areas, the resulting correlation
between competition intensity and doctor quality may, if not adequately controlled for, lead to biased
estimates. Relatedly, it has been argued that doctors who elect to live in London may be systematically
di¤erent from those who do not. In addition, care quality tends to be higher, and costs lower, in larger
health care markets, and in larger hospitals. These economies of scale, or volume e¤ects, can lead to
biased estimates if areas with larger markets and hospitals also have higher competition intensity.
While all the sources of hospital-level heterogeneity a¤ecting outcomes outlined in the previous
paragraph are a threat to identication of a causal e¤ect, I argue that they can be adequately controlled
for using observables. I address concerns that teaching and university hospitals may attract better
doctors by including dummy variables for these hospital types in all regressions.44 I address concerns
about systematic di¤erences between London and elsewhere by running a robustness test that excludes
all London hospitals from the regressions. And economies of scale at the hospital and market level are
addressed by including controls for the sites total annual case load for that procedure and its quadratic,
the trusts total annual number of admissions for all causes and its quadratic, and catchment area
population density (people per hectare). As total and procedure-specic admissions may be inuenced
by hospital quality in the period after the introduction of patient choice, in the main specication lagged
values of these variables and their quadratics (their average and total values respectively over the three
years from 2002/3 to 2004/5) are used in place of current-period values.45
While other sources of omitted variable bias due to unobserved correlates of geography cannot be
completely ruled out, these controls do a good job of addressing the most worrisome non-casemix sources
of hospital-level heterogeneity that inuence outcomes. Therefore, I argue that, in conjunction with a
value-added indicator of outcomes to control for casemix bias at the individual level, they enable the
identication of the causal e¤ect of hospital competition on elective surgery quality.
5.4 Additional competition indices
This paper centres hospital markets on patientsneighbourhoods of residence, rather than on hospitals
themselves, in order to ameliorate concerns about the possible inuence of hospital quality on (its
measures of) competition intensity. An alternative method of addressing this concern, employed by
Cooper et al. (2011), is to centre hospital markets on GP surgeries. In the UK, patients are required, in
the vast majority of cases, to register with a GP that is close to their home. The address of the GP surgery
thus provides a good proxy for the patients home address. As a check on the results obtained using
neighbourhood-centred markets, yearly GP-centred HHIs are also calculated. For each elective surgery
observation, the straight line distance from GP surgery to hospital is calculated, and the GP surgerys
market for each year and surgical procedure is dened as the GP-centred circle that encompasses 95 per
cent of the treatment locations of the GP surgerys patients. Any hospital that lies within this circle is
considered to be in the GP surgerys market, irrespective of whether the GP surgery refers any patients
to the hospital. That is, each GPs market includes all patients that attend hospitals within the GP
surgerys 95 per cent market radius, irrespective of the GP surgery at which they are registered. An HHI
is calculated for each GP-procedure-year combination, and an overall GP-year HHI is then calculated as
a weighted average of procedure-level HHIs. Finally, a hospital-level HHI is calculated as the weighted
sum of the GP-level HHIs of its patientsGP surgeries.46
I also calculate a competition index similar to that used by Propper et al. (2004) and Bloom et al.
(2015), in which intensity of competition experienced by hospital j is equal to the number of hospitals
44 In addition, to address the concern that Foundation Trust hospitals (which have greater autonomy than standard NHS
hospitals) may attract higher-quality sta¤, a robustness test includes a dummy variable for Foundation Trust status. This
dummy variable is not included in the main regressions because acquisition of Foundation Trust status was endogenous to
hospital quality during this period.
45Likewise, catchment area population density is calculated as the average population density (from the 2011 census) of
the MSOAs of residence of the hospitals patients between 2002/3 and 2004/5, instead of using the MSOAs of residence of
the hospitals current patients.
46This nal stage of aggregation, which was not undertaken by Cooper et al. (2011), ensures that treatment intensity is
the same for every patient attending a given hospital in a given year.
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within 30km of j.47 Table 9 reports summary statistics for all the competition indices examined in this
paper. Table 10 reports the correlation between these competition indices, a dummy variable indicating
that the patient lives in an urban area, and population density in the hospitals catchment area.
5.5 Data sources and control variables
This paper is based on two NHS datasets the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), which contains a record
for every hospital visit by an NHS patient in England, and the PROMs survey responses by individual
patients.48 The HES dataset used in this study encompasses eleven nancial years, from 2002/3 to
2012/13. In addition to containing all elective admissions for the four PROMs procedures, the dataset
includes all admissions for two additional elective procedures, knee arthroscopy and cataract repair,
which are used to construct the competition measures.49 Finally, the dataset includes all non-elective
AMI admissions. In total there are 8.6 million observations.
The PROMs dataset for 2009/10 to 2012/13 contains 525,538 non-duplicate survey responses where
the epikey eld (which allows the record to be linked to HES) is present. NHS Digital (2016) indicates
that this constitutes approximately 60 per cent of all surgical procedures eligible for inclusion in the
PROMs programme. Of these, 505,396  or 96.2 per cent  were successfully matched to the HES
dataset. After excluding observations with 50 or fewer cases for the procedure and nancial year in
question, as well as applying other minor exclusion criteria, there are 495,347 observations available
for the regressions. Regression sample sizes are smaller than this number due to unavailability of the
post-operative survey, or (in a smaller number of cases) missing data on hospital competition intensity
or volumes.
Patient-level controls include dummies for gender crossed with age (in ve-year intervals), and
dummies for day and month of operation (to control for day-of-week and seasonality e¤ects). They also
include dummies indicating a day case, lowand highseverity (respectively, one diagnosis, and three or
more diagnoses), and residence in an urban area, as well as the patients Charlson score, which indicates
the patients 10-year survival probability based on their health status in relation to 17 conditions likely
to lead to death. Finally, a control is included for the Index of Multiple Deprivations income deprivation
score (Noble et al. 2004), which measures the percentage of households in the patients Lower Super
Output Area (LSOA) of residence that are income deprived.50
Dummies are also included to indicate whether the hospital (site) is part of a specialist trust, a
teaching trust, a university trust, or a private provider (a dummy variable denoting a standard acute
trust is omitted).51 As discussed in Section 5.3, scale e¤ects are addressed via controls for pre-reform
average number of procedures undertaken at the hospital site and its quadratic, pre-reform average total
admissions for the hospital trust and its quadratic, and catchment area population density. Finally,
year-specic dummies are included to indicate the region of England in which the hospital site is located,
to account for changing health policies at the Strategic Health Authority level, as well as any other
region-level trends. Table 11 provides average values for key control variables used in this paper.
47Simple xed radiusmeasures of this kind are subject to bias due to di¤erences in travel time between rural and urban
areas  they overestimate competition intensity in urban areas, and underestimate it in rural areas. Nonetheless, they
provide an interesting alternative perspective to the other competition indices used in this paper.
48NHS patients can be treated either in NHS (public) hospitals, or in private hospitals that are registered to accept
NHS patients. A dummy variable is included in all regressions to denote treatment in a private hospital. HES does not
include private (e.g. privately insured) patients treated at private hospitals. However, private patients comprise only a
small percentage (less than 10 per cent) of the total hospital market in England.
49The elective surgical procedures used to construct the competition indices in this paper follow Cooper et al. (2011).
Varicose vein stripping is added to the ve elective surgical procedures used in that paper. This ensures that all the PROMs
procedures are used as inputs to the competition indices used here. For the four PROMs procedures, a broader denition
of each procedure is used than that employed by the PROMs programme, in order to dene the marketfor each procedure
in a meaningful and intuitive way for the purpose of constructing the competition indices; see Appendix 3 for procedure
and diagnosis codes.
50As poverty is associated with poor health, the IMD income deprivation score may control for unobserved dimensions
of health status that inuence outcomes.
51To make the hospital dummy variables exclusive, specialist university trusts are categorised as specialist, and teaching
university trusts are categorised as teaching. A very small number of community care trusts enter our dataset for groin
hernia repair and varicose vein stripping; these are grouped with standard acute trusts. A dummy denoting whether a
hospital is a Foundation Trust is not included, for reasons discussed in Footnote 44.
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6 Results
6.1 Main estimates
Table 12 reports cross-sectional estimates of the impact of competition on elective surgery quality as
captured by casemix-adjusted PROMs health gains. Competition is measured as a neighbourhood-centred,
hospital-level HHI based on actual patient choices. Table 12 indicates that competition has a negative
e¤ect on orthopaedic surgery quality as captured by the Oxford Hip/Knee Score, and varicose vein
surgery quality as captured by the Aberdeen Questionnaire, both signicant at the 5 per cent level.
There are no statistically signicant treatment e¤ects using the EQ-5D.
Table 13 reports the rst stage estimates from this papers headline specication, which includes two
forms of instrumentation an HHI constructed using patient choices predicted on the basis of exogenous
variables, and instrumentation of current-period HHIs by their average pre-reform (2002/3 to 2004/5)
value. Table 13 shows that the coe¢ cient on the excluded instrument, pre-reform average HHI, is between
0.940 and 0.964, and highly statistically signicant, in all specications, indicating that hospital-level
HHIs based on predicted patient choices exhibit very little year-on-year variation during the study period.
Table 14 reports the second stage estimates. It indicates a negative e¤ect of competition on the
quality of orthopaedic surgery as captured by the EQ-5D (10 per cent level) and the Oxford Hip/Knee
Score (5 per cent level), and varicose vein stripping surgery as captured by the Aberdeen Questionnaire
(5 per cent level). Pooling all four PROMs procedures together using the EQ-5D, competition has a
negative e¤ect on elective surgery quality signicant at the 10 per cent level.
Patients from urban areas have lower health gains from surgery. Although the coe¢ cients on
variables capturing patient severity should be interpreted with caution given that outcomes are already
casemix-adjusted, they indicate that sicker patients (those with a higher Charlson score, or with three or
more diagnoses) have lower health gains from surgery. Interestingly, the procedure-specic controls for
hospital volume are not statistically signicant, while for all outcomes except the Aberdeen Questionnaire,
the Trust-wide controls for hospital volume are statistically signicant. In all cases where a volume control
is statistically signicant, the linear term is negative while the quadratic term is positive, indicating that,
for su¢ ciently large volumes, higher volumes imply larger health gains per patient.
It is possible to make use of the cardinality of the EQ-5D to provide a sense of the magnitudes of these
treatment e¤ects. A one standard deviation increase in competition intensity (0.6777) leads to a decrease
in health gain from orthopaedic surgery of 0.005 (=  0:00756  0:6777). An average orthopaedic surgery
patient experiences an increase in health status from 0.358 before surgery to 0.735 after surgery. If their
hospital experienced a one standard deviation increase in competition intensity, their post-surgical health
status would be only 0.730. Thus, they would be indi¤erent between one year in their post-operative
heath state and 0.730 years in perfect health, as opposed to 0.735 years before the increase in competition.
These negative impacts of competition on health gains from elective surgery are small, but nonetheless
distinguishable from zero.
6.2 Robustness tests
Table 15 presents results when the papers headline regressions for orthopaedic surgery are disaggregated
into separate regressions for hip replacement and knee replacement. They show that the results di¤er
little between the two surgical procedures, but are marginally more statistically signicant for knee
replacement surgery when the EQ-5D is used. Table 16 reports estimates using the PROMs with smaller
e¤ect sizes  the EQ-5D for varicose vein stripping and groin hernia repair, and the EQ-VAS for all
PROMs procedures. As expected, these estimates are less statistically signicant than those reported in
Tables 12 and 14. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that all but one of the reported coe¢ cients indicate a
negative e¤ect of competition on quality.
Table 17 reports robustness tests using alternative measures of competition intensity. Row (1) uses an
HHI based on actual patient choices rather than predicted patient choices. The results remain signicant
for orthopaedic surgery, but not for the other outcomes. Row (2) reports estimates using a GP-centred,
hospital-level HHI dened using the 95th percentile of distance from GP to hospital. Using this index of
competition, the estimates for orthopaedic surgery using the Oxford Hip/Knee Score remain statistically
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signicant. Finally, Row (3) reports estimates using a simple xed distance measure, in which competition
is dened as the number of competitors within 30 kilometres. In this specication, the estimates for
varicose vein stripping using the Aberdeen Questionnaire remain statistically signicant. Overall, these
robustness tests using alternative competition indices, while not always as statistically signicant as our
headline estimates, strengthen the overall impression that hospital competition during this era had a
negative e¤ect on elective surgery quality, and on orthopaedic surgery quality in particular.
Table 18 reports estimates using alternative specications but the same outcome variables and
competition indices as in Table 14, with an HHI constructed using predicted patient choices and current-
period competition intensity instrumented by its average pre-reform value. Studies of hospital competition
in England are often criticised on the grounds that they simply pick up di¤erences between London and
the rest of the country. Row (1) reports estimates when all London hospitals are excluded. The results
are largely unchanged. Row (2) reports estimates when a dummy variable indicating a Foundation Trust
is included, while Row (3) reports estimates when the sample is restricted to public (NHS) hospitals.
The results in both cases are virtually identical to those reported in Table 14. It might be worried
that interacting year dummies and region of England dummies soaks up too much variation, and thus
reduces the statistical signicance of the estimates reported in Table 14. Row (4) reports estimates when
year dummies and region of England dummies are included as separate controls, instead of interacted
with each other. Contrary to the worry that motivated this robustness test, the results are reduced in
magnitude and statistical signicance.
Row (5) reports estimates when the control for catchment area population density and the dummy
variable for living in an urban area are not included, while Rows (6) and (7) report estimates when only
one of these variables is omitted. The results are much more statistically signicant in all cases. This is
a particularly important nding, as controls for catchment area population density are rarely included
when estimating the causal e¤ect of competition on quality. Row (8) reports estimates when catchment
area population density is calculated based on the home MSOAs of current patients, as opposed to
patients in the three years before the introduction of patient choice (2002/3-2004/5). The results are
very similar to those reported in Table 14.
To ameliorate concerns about endogeneity of the hospital scale controls (total and procedure-specic
admissions, and their respective quadratics), the main specication uses the pre-reform average values
of these variables in place of their current-period values. Row (9) reports estimates using an alternative
approach, namely instrumenting current-period values of these variables with their pre-reform averages.
The results are very similar to those reported in Table 14, albeit with a small loss of statistical signicance
in some cases. Row (10) reports estimates when all scale e¤ects controls (total and procedure-level
admissions, and their respective quadratics) are omitted. Only the estimates using the Aberdeen Varicose
Vein Questionnaire remain statistically signicant. The ndings in Row (10) do not raise questions about
the robustness of our main results, but merely indicate that hospital scale e¤ects are an important driver
of outcomes, and need to be controlled for.52
Row (11) reports estimates when all non-binary variables are logged. The results are qualitatively
identical to those reported in Table 14. Row (12) reports estimates when hospital xed e¤ects are
included in the regression. Consistent with my initial hypothesis that there is insu¢ cient exogenous
within-hospital variation in competition intensity to enable the identication of treatment e¤ects when
hospital xed e¤ects are included, the estimates reported in Row (12) are not statistically signicant.
Finally, Table 19 reports estimates when a linear time trend interacted with competition is included
in addition to competition on its own. With the possible exception of the Aberdeen Varicose Vein
Questionnaire, the results do not support the hypothesis that the e¤ect of competition on elective surgery
quality exhibited a trend over the study period. Rather, the negative e¤ect of competition on elective
surgery quality does not seem to vary over time.
52Omitting all hospital scale e¤ects controls increases sample size by 18,000, as some volume controls are missing for
some observations. I have conrmed that the loss of statistical signicance reported in Row (10) of Table 18 is driven by
the omission of hospital scale e¤ects, not by the inclusion of these additional observations.
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7 Discussion and conclusions
7.1 Discussion
Overall, the evidence seems to indicate that the hospital competition brought about by the 2006 English
NHS patient choice reforms had a negative impact on quality of orthopaedic surgery and varicose vein
stripping surgery signicant at the 5 per cent level. Pooling all PROMs procedures together using
the EQ-5D, competition had a negative e¤ect on elective surgery quality signicant at the 10 per cent
level. The estimates for orthopaedic surgery using the Oxford Hip/Knee Score are particularly robust
to alternative specications. However, even when the coe¢ cients on competition using other outcome
measures and surgical procedures are not statistically signicant in the robustness tests, they are almost
always negative in sign.
Two questions naturally arise from these ndings. Why does competition appear to have had a
negative e¤ect on orthopaedic and varicose vein surgery quality? And, how should these ndings be
understood in relation to the existing literature (Cooper et al. 2011; Gaynor et al. 2013; Bloom et al.
2015), which indicates that competition in the English NHS during this era led to lower mortality rates?
Section Four put forward a model that could simultaneously explain both these ndings from the
literature, and this papers ndings. While information about hospitals performance in relation to
PROMs health gains has been available to researchers since 2010, little attempt was made, during the
period of study, to communicate these data to patients undergoing a PROMs procedure when choosing a
hospital. On the other hand, the NHS Choices website, which helps such patients to choose a hospital by
providing information about the performance of nearby hospitals, did report overall hospital mortality
rates to patients undergoing a PROMs procedure, even though this statistic is of little direct relevance
to the elective surgical procedures covered by PROMs. It may be that hospitals, knowing this situation,
focused on improving their performance in relation to publicly reported dimensions of performance, such
as mortality rates, at the expense of other areas of activity in which quality is not reported to patients.
A more general hypothesis is that the hospital competition engendered by the patient choice reforms
had a positive e¤ect on hospital performance via a more di¤use mechanism than that considered by formal
economic models. That is, perhaps competition leads to improved behaviour not via actual exertion
of patient choice, leading to changes in market shares and hence behaviour, but instead by making
hospital managers in more competitive markets feel, in a more general sense, that their performance is
under scrutiny, and that they therefore need to lift their game in relation to observable and high-prole
performance indicators such as mortality. Such a mechanism could explain why competition for elective
surgery patients appears to have led to lower mortality rates in high competition areas, but not to
improved elective surgery quality as captured by less prominent performance indicators.
Alternatively, a similar more di¤use e¤ect could operate via patient choice  perhaps a hospitals
mortality rates a¤ect its overall reputation for quality, and perhaps elective surgery patients choose
which hospital to attend on the basis of this general reputation, rather than on the basis of knowledge
about hospital quality in the specic surgical specialty that encompasses their procedure. If patients
choose in such a manner, it would make perfect sense for a hospital to focus on reducing mortality instead
of on and perhaps at the expense of improving elective surgery quality.
7.2 Conclusions
Previous studies of hospital competition and quality have tended to focus on mortality-based indicators
of hospital performance, yet in the spheres of hospital activity where competition for patients does occur,
such as elective surgery, mortality is a relatively uncommon outcome. The approach of these previous
studies has been informed by a theoretical framework that explicitly or implicitly assumes that quality
is a hospital-wide variable, or at least has a signicant hospital-wide component.
This paper, by contrast, has conceptualised the hospital as a multi-product rm, in which managers
make separate quality choices in di¤erent areas of activity. I have shown that there is little evidence
that a hospitals emergency care quality (as captured by mortality rates) is correlated with its elective
surgery quality (as captured by PROMs health gains), and put forward a theoretical model in which
the e¤ect of hospital competition on clinical quality is di¤erentiated by output type, and inuenced
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by complementarities and substitutabilities between output types in production. I test this theoretical
model using new performance indicators Patient Reported Outcome Measures of health gain from four
high-volume elective surgical procedures that, by equating outcomes with value added (health gain)
from treatment rather than post-treatment health status, enables hospital performance to be measured
at the level of the individual surgical procedure to a far greater extent than existing failure-based
indicators of hospital performance such as mortality or readmissions. As well as enabling a more granular
approach to health care provider performance measurement, the use of value-added outcome measures
also represents a fundamental advance in the challenge of disentangling the contribution of provider
performance and patient characteristics to health outcomes.
In contrast to the existing literature, this paper nds that, when value-added, elective-surgery-specic
outcome measures are used, it appears that the introduction of patient choice of hospital for elective
surgery to the English NHS during the 2000s may have had a negative e¤ect on clinical quality in
at least some areas. This nding, though provisional, calls into question a common interpretation of
previous econometric studies of the English NHS patient choice reforms (Cooper et al. 2011; Gaynor et
al. 2013; Bloom et al. 2015) namely that they show that hospital competition led to across-the-board
improvements in care quality. This papers nding that hospital mortality rates and PROMs health gains
are essentially uncorrelated suggests that, in fact, the very notion of a hospital-wideindicator of clinical
quality is questionable.
On the other hand, this papers ndings do not support one commonly heard criticism of the
econometric literature on the English NHS  namely that hospital behaviour is simply unresponsive
to the economic environment. In fact, this papers ndings suggest that hospitals are, if anything,
more responsive to the incentives environment within which they operate than has been suggested
by the existing literature, in the sense that hospital responses to the competitive environment may
be di¤erentiated by area of activity, depending on the observability of performance in each area, the
extent to which performance is incentivised in each area, and the interactions between incentivised and
unincentivised areas in the production process. These ndings are consistent with the literature on public
organisation (see e.g. Dixit 2002; Propper & Wilson 2003; Holmstrom & Milgrom 1991), which predicts
that standard economic incentive structures drawn from the private sector will have more complex e¤ects
including, potentially, perverse e¤ects when applied to the public sector, given the existence, within
the latter, of multiple dimensions of performance, many of which are not fully measured or observable.
This papers ndings, although tentative, run counter to the conventional wisdom that xed-price
hospital competition should lead to higher clinical quality. This conventional wisdom forms the basis
for much health policy for instance, it has inuenced market-based reforms to government-run health
care systems, and informs the thinking of anti-trust regulators responsible for approving mergers of
health care providers. The fact that this papers ndings deviate substantially from those of the existing
literature suggests the need for follow-up work seeking to replicate these ndings in di¤erent settings,
and with di¤erent identication settings, but using similar value-added, elective-surgery-specic outcome
measures.
It would be particularly valuable to seek to replicate this papers ndings in a setting where it is
possible to identify the e¤ect of competition on elective surgery quality in a model that includes hospital
xed e¤ects, the traditional method of controlling for the geographical correlates of competition. I argue
that the use of a (casemix-adjusted) value-added outcome measure is a convincing alternative method
of controlling for the most worrying geographical correlate of competition, namely patient health status,
and that other potential geographically-driven sources of bias can be controlled for using observables.
Nonetheless, uncertainties remain in relation to both arguments, and employing hospital xed e¤ects
alongside a value-added outcome measure would be one way of resolving them. Whatever these follow-up
studies nd, the present papers ndings highlight the limitations of single-output-type models of the
hospital, the value of conceptualising the hospital as a multi-product rm, and the importance of assessing
hospital performance using indicators that are di¤erentiated by output type, and based on the value
added from hospital treatment.
In a paper showing that hospital competition in the English NHS in the 1990s led to higher mortality
rates, Propper et al. (2004, p.1267) conclude by discussing the fact that hospital mortality rates were
not publicly available during the 1990s, noting drily that it may have been a mistake to delay the
publication of quality signals until some 10 years after the introduction of a market meant to rely on
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them. The present studys ndings suggest that a similar point might apply to the post-2006 era of
hospital competition driven by patient choice of hospital for elective surgery. To be sure, as compared
with the 1990s Internal Market, vastly more data about hospital performance was available from 2006
onwards to both patients and researchers. Nonetheless, there were few or no elective-surgery-specic
indicators of clinical quality provided to patients. The NHS PROMs programme, which was developed
in response to a recognition of this deciency, commenced in 2009/10, several years after the inauguration
of a new era of provider competition premised on the existence of meaningful signals of elective surgery
quality.
Even after the PROMs programme commenced, the resulting data were published as experimental
statistics on the back alley of an NHS website of data sources. Given this situation, it is perhaps
not surprising that NHS hospitals may have responded to this new era of competition by prioritising
performance improvements in salient and high-prole areas such as mortality, in spite of the fact that
few hospital deaths occur in parts of the hospital subject to competitive forces, and furthermore that
these performance improvements may even have come at the expense of performance in lower-prole
areas, including those directly inuencing health outcomes in elective surgery.
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Appendix 1: Replicating the NHS PROMs casemix adjustment
methodology for patient-level data
This paper has adapted the current NHS PROMs casemix adjustment methodology for provider-level data
to derive risk-adjusted health gain from surgery at the patient level.53 This methodology is somewhat
simpler than the NHS methodology, as aggregation to the provider level is not required. The current
NHS casemix adjustment methodology involves the estimation of a linear model with provider (hospital)
xed e¤ects:54
Q2i = + 1Q1i + 
0
2xi + 
0
3zij + uj + "ij (5)
In Equation (5), Q2i and Q1i denote, respectively, the post-operative and pre-operative survey score
for patient i attending hospital j; xi is a vector of patient characteristics; zij is a vector of variables
containing information about the patients hospital stay;55 uj is a hospital xed e¤ect; and "ij is an
error term. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital site level. The risk adjustment is performed
separately for each procedure and outcome variable included in the PROMs programme; revisions to
hip and knee replacement surgery are treated separately to primary hip and knee replacements. The
control variables included in xi and zij are chosen by regressing Equation (5) using a large, standard set
of controls (listed in Tables A2 and A3; NHS England 2013b), and then re-running the regression using
only those variables that are signicant at the 5 per cent level. From this regression the tted Q2i, dQ2i,
is calculated: dQ2i = b+c1Q1i + c02xi + c03zij + buj
Secondly, the predictedQ2i, gQ2i, is dened as the post-operative score that would have been
expected in the absence of the hospitals contribution to the patients health gain. This is calculated by
subtracting the hospital xed e¤ect, u^j , from the tted Q2i, and, as a normalisation, replacing it withbu, the (weighted) mean value of the hospital xed e¤ect.56 That is:
gQ2i = dQ2i   buj + bu = b+c1Q1i + c02xi + c03zij + bu
Thirdly, the providers Relative Performance Factor (RPF) the ratio of actual post-operative health
status to predicted post-operative health status is calculated for patient i:57
RPFi =
Q2igQ2i
Finally, the adjusted Q2 score (Q2ai) and adjusted health gain (Qai) are calculated with reference
to Q2 and Q1, the national average (by procedure and year) Q2 and Q1 scores:58
Q2ai = RPFi Q2
Qai = Q2ai  Q1
53A rigorous and fully specied risk-adjustment methodology was published in 2012 (DH 2012a; b; c; d; e). This
methodology was modied in 2013, but many of the changes made at this time are poorly documented and/or justied
(NHS England 2013a; b). The approach adopted here therefore adopts some of the 2013 changes, but retains features of
the 2012 methodology when those changes are either questionable or incompletely documented.
54The present study denes a provider as a hospital site.
55Both xi and zij are vectors of patient-level control variables zij cannot contain any variables that are invariant at
the hospital level, as these are incorporated into the hospital xed e¤ect.
56 If N is the total number of patients for a given procedure and nancial year, and nj is the number of hospital js
patients, so
P
8j nj = N , then bu =P8j njN u^j
57Calculation and interpretation of the RPF is complicated when the outcome variable can take either positive or negative
values, as is the case for the EQ-5D Index Score. In response to related problems, in 2013 the NHS moved to calculating
an additive rather than a multiplicative RPF (NHS England 2013a). This paper retains the use of a multiplicative RPF
as set out in DH 2012a, and instead adds 0.594 (the maximum negative value for the EQ-5D Index Score) to all Q1 and
Q2 scores before performing risk adjustment, and then subtracting 0.594 back out from the Q1 and Q2 scores, and any
derivatives of these (including the adjusted Q2 score) after performing the risk adjustment.
58Adjusted gain is calculated by taking the di¤erence between the adjusted Q2 score and the national average Q1 score,
rather than the individual patients Q1 score, because the individual Q1 score has already been controlled for when risk
adjusting Q2. An alternative method would be to omit the Q1 score from Q2 risk adjustment, adjust both Q2 and Q1
scores for casemix separately, and then calculate adjusted health gain as the di¤erence between these two adjusted scores.
The method employed here has the advantage of not requiring any adjustment of the Q1 scores.
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As is well known from the example of estimating probabilities, estimating limited dependent variables
using linear regression methods can lead to predicted values that are outside the support of the dependent
variable. This is a known potential problem with existing PROMs casemix adjustment methods (Coles
2010, p.10). While there is a literature seeking to address this concern (Hernández et al. 2012; Basu
and Manca 2012; Gutacker et al. 2013), it is not clear that the use of linear regression models for
risk adjustment poses serious problems in contexts where, unlike the case of estimating probabilities,
the absolute level of the dependent variable is not all that important, such as when comparing the
performance of health care providers. Furthermore, there may be advantages to not truncating the
support of the dependent variable when adjusting for casemix. Consider the situation of a patient who
records a post-operative EQ-5D prole of 11111 or perfect health, implying an EQ-5D index score of
1. If this patients characteristics (including pre-operative score) made such an outcome very unlikely,
the patient should, arguably, receive a post-operative score greater than 1, even though this implies a
conceptually problematic more than perfect health.
Table A1 provides the minima and maxima of the scale, observed, and adjusted minimum and
maximum post-operative (Q2) scores for the di¤erent PROMs used in this paper. Table A1 demonstrates
that, while the adjusted scores project outside the original support of the outcome variable in all cases,
they do not do so in a way that drastically distorts the interpretation of the outcome measure. Table
A2 lists the variables used for casemix adjustment, and the coe¢ cients on each variable for each of the
papers main outcome variables.
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Appendix 2: Details of predicted patient choice model
This Appendix presents the details of the predicted patient choice model used in the present study, which
is based on Kessler & McClellan (2000) and Gaynor et al. (2013).59
A2.1 The Conditional Logit Model
This study uses a conditional logit model to predict each patients choice of hospital based on plausibly
exogenous parameters. The conditional logit model is an extension of the multinomial logit model that
allows determinants of outcomes (here, hospital choices) to be a function of characteristics of those
outcomes (hospitals) and not just, as in the multinomial logit model, a function of characteristics of
the individuals themselves. Let Hi denote patient is choice of hospital: Hi = j denotes that hospital
j is chosen. Let xi (with hospital-specic coe¢ cients j) be a vector of individual-specic explanatory
variables that are independent of choice of hospital, and let zij (with coe¢ cients ) be a vector of
explanatory variables that may either be hospital-level variables or patient-level variables that are a
function of choice of hospital. Let patient is utility from alternative j be an additive function of a
systematic component 0jxi + 
0zij and a random component "ij :
Uij = 
0
jxi + 
0zij + "ij
Since utility has a random component ("ij), the probability that i will choose j, ij , is the probability
that j is the utility maximising choice of hospital:
ij = Pr(Hi = j) = fPr(maxfUi1; Ui2; : : : ; UiJg) = Uijg
Let ij denote the log of the odds that i will choose hospital j against reference hospital J . Then, if it
is assumed that "ij is distributed standard Type 1 extreme value with cumulative distribution function
F (") = exp(  exp( ")),60 it can be shown (Maddala 1983) that ij is a linear function of the explanatory
variables, xi and zij :
ij = log

ij
iJ

= 0jxi + 
0zij
ij = iJ exp(ij) = iJ exp(
0
jxi + 
0zij) (6)
Summing Equation (6) over all J hospitals and noting that
PJ
j=1 ij = 1 yields that:
iJ =
1PJ
j=1 exp
 
ij
 (7)
Plugging the expression for iJ from Equation (7) into Equation (6), and replacing the js in the
former with s, yields:
ij =
exp(ij)PJ
=1 exp (i)
=
exp(0jxi + 
0zij)PJ
=1 exp
 
0jxi + 0zij

The parameters of the model (js and ) are estimated by maximum likelihood.
A2.2 Model setup
The hospitals in a patients choice set are dened to include their chosen hospital plus any hospital
within 100km of their MSOA of residence. The choice set must also include the two closest: teaching
59This Appendix draws from Maddala (1983) and Rodríguez (2007), and above all from Gaynor et al. (2013).
60The Type 1 (Gumbel) extreme value distribution, also known as the double exponential distribution, has parameters
 and  and CDF F (x) = exp(  exp( (x   )=)). The mean is  + , where  is Eulers constant ( 0:577), and the
variance is 1
6
22 where  is the constant pi. The standardType 1 extreme value distribution is the case where  = 0
and  = 1, so F (x) = exp(  exp( x)).
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hospitals; non-teaching hospitals; big hospitals (dened as larger than the median, with reference to
trust admissions); small hospitals (dened as smaller than the median); NHS hospitals; and private
hospitals. The choice set must include these hospitals because the model postulates that patients may
have preferences over the type of hospital they attend (whether in relation to teaching status, size, or
NHS vs private), and that utility from attending a given hospital is a function not only of distance to
that hospital, but also of the di¤erence between distance to that hospital, and distance to an alternative
hospital with similar (or di¤erent) characteristics.
Let h 2 f1; 2; 3g denote the three dimensions of hospital type over which preferences are dened 
h = 1 refers to the distinction between teaching and non-teaching hospitals, h = 2 to the distinction
between big and small hospitals, and h = 3 to the distinction between NHS and private hospitals. Let zhj
be a binary indicator of whether hospital j possesses characteristic h: z1j = 1 denotes a teaching hospital,
z2j = 1 a big hospital, and z
3
j = 1 an NHS hospital.
Let dij denote distance from the centroid of patient is MSOA to hospital j, and let dhij+ denote the
distance to the closest hospital that is a good substitute for hospital j in terms of characteristic h. That
is, if h = 1 and j is a teaching hospital, then dhij+ denotes the distance to the closest teaching hospital
(other than hospital j, if it is the closest). Likewise, let dhij  denote the distance to the closest hospital
that is a poor substitute for hospital j in terms of characteristic h. Thus, with h = 1 and j a teaching
hospital, dhij  would denote the distance to the closest non-teaching hospital. Utility from attending
hospital j is dened as a function of the di¤erence between distance to j and the distance to the nearest
good/poor substitute for j in terms of each of the three dimensions of hospital types included in the
model.61 Specically, patient is utility from attending hospital j is dened as:
Uij =
3X
h=1
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
h1

dij   dhij+

zhj + 
h
2

dij   dhij+
  
1  zhj

+h3

dij   dhij 

zhj + 
h
4

dij   dhij 
  
1  zhj

+h5
 
femalei midi  zhj

+ h6
 
femalei  oldi  zhj

+h7
 
malei  youngi  zhj

+ j8
 
malei midi  zhj

+ h9
 
male  oldi  zhj

+h10
 
lowseverityi  zhj

+ h11
 
highseverityi  zhj

+ h12
 
charlsoni  zhj

+h13
 
urbani  zhj

+ h14
 
poori  zhj

+ h
 
regioni  zhj

+ "ij
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
(8)
Only two of the rst four terms will be turned on for any given dimension h. For example, if j is
a private hospital, then z3j = 0 and so the 
3
1 and 
3
3 terms will be turned o¤; the 
3
2 term will then
capture utility from di¤erential distance between j and the nearest private hospital, while the 34 term
will capture utility from di¤erential distance between j and the nearest NHS hospital.
In addition to these di¤erential distance terms, which are used to satisfy the exclusion restriction, the
model seeks to capture possible di¤erences in preferences for di¤erent hospital types based on patient
characteristics. Terms are therefore included to capture di¤erences in utility from attending a teaching
hospital, a big hospital, or an NHS hospital (relative to attending a non-teaching hospital, a small
hospital, or a private hospital respectively) based on a range of exogenous variables describing patient
characteristics. The number of variables that can be included in the model is constrained by the fact that
computation time is relative to the square of the number of choice determinants. Casemix is therefore
accounted for by dividing patients into three age categories  young (below 60), mid (61 to 75), and
old (over 75), and crossing these with gender to give six dummies (one of which is omitted). Dummies
are also included for low and high severity (respectively, any patient with only one diagnosis code, or
with three or more diagnosis codes), as well as for the patients Charlson score. Finally, dummies are
included for urban status (any patient living in an urban area), poverty (any patient living in an area
where more than 10 per cent of households are classied as being income-deprived), and the nine regions
of England (the bold coe¢ cient and variable denote vectors). All of these variables are included in the
conditional logit model three times, as they are interacted with each of the three dimensions of hospital
heterogeneity over which patients have preferences, so that each patient characteristic can separately
enter preferences concerning each dimension.
61This denition of utility in terms of di¤erential distances is the reason the choice set needs to include the closest two
hospitals in terms of each dimension of hospital heterogeneity included in the model.
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The parameters of the model are estimated separately for each surgical procedure and nancial year.
When estimating the model, the dataset is collapsed to include a single entry for all patients that are
identical in terms of the model (that is, who attend the same hospital, live in the same MSOA, and have
the same patient characteristics). All such patients within a given subtypehave the same choice set
and the same di¤erential distances, as distances are measured in terms of distance from MSOA centroids
to hospitals. After collapsing all such identical patients, the model is then estimated using frequency
weights to reect the number of patients in each subtype.
A2.3 Model outputs
For each patient subtype, the model gives a probability of attendance for each hospital in the choice
set. These probabilities sum to one, and are used in place of the subtypes actual choice of hospital.
Thus, if there are 10 patients in a given subtype, and the conditional logit model gives probabilities
of f0:2; 0; 0:4; 0:4g for hospitals A, B, C and D, then the predicted patient choice model would allocate
2, 0, 4 and 4 patients from this subtype to each of these hospitals respectively. A (predicted) HHI is
calculated for each MSOA by aggregating across subtypes within the MSOA to calculate the sum of
hospitalssquared market shares for that MSOA; a hospitals predicted HHI is then calculated as the
weighted sum of predicted HHIs of all the MSOAs that it serves.
The resulting HHIs have a correlation of about 0.4 with MSOA-centred HHIs based on actual patient
choices. The choice estimates are robust to alternative specications of the distance used to dene each
patient subtypes choice set.
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Appendix 3: Procedure and diagnosis denitions
NHS Digital (2016) outlines the OPCS4 procedure codes used to dene participation in the PROMs
programme, as well as to distinguish between primary hip and knee replacements, and revisions to these
procedures. A broader set of denitions was used to construct the dataset used in this paper, in order to
dene the market for each procedure in an intuitive and meaningful way for the purpose of calculating
competition intensity. For example, whereas the PROMs programme only surveys groin hernia patients,
I include all hernia patients in the dataset. Also, whereas patients undergoing bilateral hip and knee
replacement surgery are excluded from the PROMs programme, I include these patients in the dataset.
Of course, the additional records in the dataset resulting from these expanded denitions are not included
in the nal regressions, as they cannot be linked to a PROMs survey response.
The following OPCS4 procedure codes and ICD10 diagnosis codes were used to construct the dataset,
matching on all 24 procedure elds and all 20 diagnosis elds in an episode.
Hip replacement: (1) W37, W38, W39, W46, W47, W48, W93, W94 or W95, or (2) W52, W53,
W54, or W58, in conjunction with Z761, Z756, or Z843.
Knee replacement: (1) O18, W40, W41, or W42, or (2) W52, W53, or W54, in conjunction with
Z765, Z771, Z774, Z844, Z845, or Z846.
Varicose veins: L84, L85, L86, L87, L88, or L93.
Hernia: T19 through to T27.
Knee arthroscopy: W82 through to W89.
Cataracts: C71 through to C77, in conjunction with ICD10 diagnosis code H25, H26, H28, or Q120.
Acute myocardial infarction: ICD10 diagnosis codes I21 or I22.
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Adjusted EQ-5D health gain vs Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
(A) Adjusted EQ-5D health gain from hip replacement vs 
Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
(B) Adjusted EQ-5D health gain from knee replacement vs 
Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
  
(C) Adjusted EQ-5D health gain from groin hernia repair vs 
Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
(D) Adjusted EQ-5D health gain from varicose vein stripping vs 
Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
  
Figure graphs the relationship between hospital trusts’ standardised (risk-adjusted) mortality rates (Standardised Hospital Mortality 
or SHM) and average casemix-adjusted health gain from elective surgery as captured by the EQ-5D PROM. In each panel, there is one 
observation for each hospital trust and financial year, covering the financial years 2009/10 to 2012/13. For 2009/10, SHM is captured 
by Dr Foster’s Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratios (HSMR) (Dr Foster 2011). For 2010/11 onwards, SHM is captured by the NHS 
Summary Hospital Mortality Indicator (SHMI) (HSCIC 2013). In 2012/13, the NHS began reporting average PROMs health gains for 
revisions to hip and knee replacements separately to PROMs health gains for primary hip and knee replacements. Therefore, for this 
year only, PROMs health gains for hip and knee replacements are based only primary procedures, and do not include health gains from 
revisions. 
  
  34 
Figure 2: Adjusted EQ-5D health gain vs AMI mortality 
(A) Adjusted EQ-5D health gain from hip replacement vs AMI 
mortality 
(B) Adjusted EQ-5D health gain from knee replacement vs AMI 
mortality 
  
(C) Adjusted EQ-5D health gain from groin hernia repair vs AMI 
mortality 
(D) Adjusted EQ-5D health gain from varicose vein stripping vs 
AMI mortality 
  
Figure graphs the relationship between individual hospital sites’ mortality rates from acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and average 
casemix-adjusted health gain from elective surgery as captured by the EQ-5D PROM. In each panel, there is one observation for each 
hospital site and financial year, covering the financial years 2009/10 to 2012/13. The AMI mortality rate is calculated as the 30-day in-
hospital mortality rate for patients aged 39 to 100, omitting all patients discharged alive with a total length of stay of less than three days, 
and including only patients admitted on an emergency basis from their place of residence. Average PROMs health gains from hip and knee 
replacements include both primary procedures and revisions. 
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Figure 3: Adjusted and Unadjusted PROMs Health Gains vs Pre-Treatment Health Status 
(A) EQ-5D Index Score for Hip Replacement: Unadjusted Health 
Gains vs Pre-Treatment Health Status 
(B) EQ-5D Index Score for Hip Replacement: Adjusted Health 
Gains vs Pre-Treatment Health Status 
  
(C) Oxford Hip Score for Hip Replacement: Unadjusted Health 
Gains vs Pre-Treatment Health Status 
(D) Oxford Hip Score for Hip Replacement: Adjusted Health Gains 
vs Pre-Treatment Health Status 
  
Figure graphs the relationship between hip replacement patients’ pre-treatment health status and their adjusted and unadjusted health 
gains from treatment. Panels (A) and (B) show this relationship for the EQ-5D Index Score, with unadjusted and adjusted health gains on 
the y-axis respectively. Panels (C) and (D) show this relationship for the Oxford Hip Score, with unadjusted and adjusted health gains on 
the y-axis respectively. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Average mortality rates for PROMs elective procedures and acute myocardial infarction 
Procedure/diagnosis Average mortality rate (per cent) 
Hip replacement 0.0617 
Knee replacement 0.0710 
Groin hernia repair 0.0117 
Varicose vein stripping 0.0000 
Acute myocardial infarction (AMI) 9.1707 
Table reports 30-day in-hospital mortality rates in the four years from 2009/10 to 2012/13. Includes all elective admissions for the four 
listed procedures, and all non-elective admissions for acute myocardial infarction (AMI). See Figure 2 notes for AMI sample restrictions. 
 
 
Table 2: Outcome variables – summary statistics 
Outcome  Surgical Procedure Observations Average health gain Standard deviation Min Max 
EQ-5D Hip Replacement 122,701 0.4324 0.2251 -0.9352 1.4821 
EQ-5D Knee Replacement 130,309 0.3226 0.2359 -0.9826 2.0375 
EQ-5D Groin Hernia 78,364 0.0943 0.168 -1.3728 1.0361 
EQ-5D Varicose Veins 24,309 0.1044 0.1865 -1.341 1.3389 
OHS Hip Replacement 135,538 20.518 8.6309 -18.8077 60.1532 
OKS Knee Replacement 142,448 15.6333 9.0858 -18.3818 83.101 
AVVQ Varicose Veins 25,711 8.202 8.705 -65.8169 72.7042 
EQ-VAS Hip Replacement 118,264 10.8475 16.6161 -64.3165 95.0956 
EQ-VAS Knee Replacement 125,250 4.9042 17.0208 -66.922 120.9261 
EQ-VAS Groin Hernia 76,282 -0.0827 13.5718 -79.2098 98.3347 
EQ-VAS Varicose Veins 23,473 0.1899 14.3065 -78.4885 94.7759 
Table reports summary statistics by surgical procedure for each of the PROMs (casemix-adjusted health gain) used in this paper. 
Abbreviations: EQ-5D (EQ-5D Index Score), OHS (Oxford Hip Score), OKS (Oxford Knee Score), AVVQ (Aberdeen Varicose Vein 
Questionnaire), EQ-VAS (EQ-5D Visual Analogue Score). 
 
 
Table 3: Effect sizes of PROMs outcome measures 
 Hip replacement Knee replacement Groin hernia Varicose veins All PROMs 
EQ-5D 1.271 0.954 0.411 0.401 0.890 
EQ-VAS 0.449 0.194 -0.028 -0.010 0.212 
OHS/OKS/AVVQ 2.377 1.936 N/A 0.726 N/A 
Table reports effect sizes (average health gain divided by standard deviation of Q1 score) of the PROMs outcome measures. See Table 
2 notes for abbreviations. 
 
 
Table 4: Convergent validity of PROMs outcome measures 
(A) Correlation between hip replacement PROMs   (B) Correlation between knee replacement PROMs 
 
  OHS EQ-5D EQ-VAS 
OHS 1     
EQ-5D 0.6338 1   
EQ-VAS 0.3343 0.3112 1 
 
 
  OKS EQ-5D EQ-VAS 
OKS 1     
EQ-5D 0.5912 1   
EQ-VAS 0.3014 0.2688 1 
 
(C) Correlation between groin hernia repair PROMs (D) Correlation between varicose vein stripping PROMs 
 
  EQ-5D EQ-VAS 
EQ-5D 1   
EQ-VAS 0.2785 1 
 
 
  AVVQ EQ-5D EQ-VAS 
AVVQ 1     
EQ-5D 0.3087 1   
EQ-VAS 0.1490 0.2247 1 
 
 
Table reports the within-observation pairwise correlation between unadjusted health gains from treatment as captured by different 
PROMs for each of the surgical procedures studied in this paper. See Table 2 notes for abbreviations. 
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Table 5: Correlation between hospital trusts’ average EQ-5D health gain from surgery and 
Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
 SHM Hip replacement 
Knee 
replacement 
Groin 
hernia 
Varicose 
veins 
(A) Correlation between unadjusted EQ-5D health gain and Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
Standardised mortality (SHM) 1     
Hip replacement: average EQ-5D health gain 0.212*** 1    
Knee replacement: average EQ-5D health gain 0.1193** 0.395*** 1   
Groin hernia: average EQ-5D health gain 0.0915** 0.0679 0.0273 1  
Varicose veins: average EQ-5D health gain 0.0608 0.0585 -0.0175 0.1091** 1 
(B) Correlation between adjusted EQ-5D health gain and Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
Standardised mortality (SHM) 1     
Hip replacement: average adjusted EQ-5D health gain -0.0234 1    
Knee replacement: average adjusted EQ-5D health gain 0.0903** 0.3224*** 1   
Groin hernia: average adjusted EQ-5D health gain -0.0172 0.1367*** 0.0536 1  
Varicose veins: average adjusted EQ-5D health gain 0.1749*** 0.1147* 0.1755*** 0.0985 1 
Table reports the pairwise correlations between hospital trusts’ annual standardised (risk-adjusted) mortality rates (Standardised 
Hospital Mortality or SHM) and average annual health gains, as captured by the EQ-5D, from the four elective surgical procedures 
included in the PROMs programme, covering the years 2009/10 to 2012/13. See Figure 1 notes for SHM sources. Panel (A) uses raw 
(unadjusted) EQ-5D health gains, while Panel (B) uses casemix-adjusted EQ-5D health gains. Statistical significance is reported as 
follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Statistical significance after applying a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons is denoted 
by the underlined stars. Average EQ-5D health gains from hip and knee replacement in 2012/13 exclude data from patients undergoing 
revisions to these procedures; see Figure 1 notes for more.  
 
 
Table 6: Correlation between hospitals sites’ average EQ-5D health gain from surgery and 
mortality rate from acute myocardial infarction (AMI) 
 AMI mortality 
Hip 
Replacement 
Knee 
Replacement 
Groin 
Hernia 
Varicose 
Veins 
(A) Correlation between unadjusted EQ-5D health gain and AMI mortality rate 
Acute myocardial infarction (AMI) mortality rate 1     
Hip replacement: average EQ-5D health gain 0.0216 1    
Knee replacement: average EQ-5D health gain -0.0112 0.1678*** 1   
Groin hernia: average EQ-5D health gain 0.0159 0.0486 0.0271 1  
Varicose veins: average EQ-5D health gain -0.0101 -0.0474 -0.0311 0.1252*** 1 
(B) Correlation between adjusted EQ-5D health gain and AMI mortality rate 
Acute myocardial infarction (AMI) mortality rate 1     
Hip replacement: average adjusted EQ-5D health gain -0.0096 1    
Knee replacement: average adjusted EQ-5D health gain 0.0149 0.1952*** 1   
Groin hernia: average adjusted EQ-5D health gain 0.0219 0.0643* -0.0167 1  
Varicose veins: average adjusted EQ-5D health gain -0.0388 -0.0639 0.0347 0.0234 1 
Table reports the pairwise correlations between hospital sites’ annual mortality rates from acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and average 
annual health gains, as captured by the EQ-5D, from the four elective surgical procedures included in the PROMs programme, covering 
the years 2009/10 to 2012/13. See Figure 2 notes for AMI sample restrictions. Panel (A) uses raw (unadjusted) EQ-5D health gains, 
while Panel (B) uses casemix-adjusted EQ-5D health gains. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Statistical significance after applying a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons is denoted by the underlined stars. Average 
PROMs health gains from hip and knee replacements include both primary procedures and revisions. 
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Table 7: Correlation between change in hospital trusts’ average adjusted EQ-5D health gain from 
surgery and change in Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
 SHM Hip replacement 
Knee 
replacement 
Groin 
hernia 
Varicose 
veins 
Change in Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 1     
Hip replacement: change in average adjusted EQ-5D health gain 0.0016 1    
Knee replacement: change in average adjusted EQ-5D health gain -0.0213 0.1003** 1   
Groin hernia: change in average adjusted EQ-5D health gain -0.0123 0.0417 0.0585 1  
Varicose veins: change in average adjusted EQ-5D health gain -0.0944 0.1279 0.1298 0.045 1 
Table reports the pairwise correlations between hospital trusts’ first differenced (year-to-year) Standardised Hospital Mortality (SHM) 
and first differenced (year-to-year) average casemix-adjusted health gain, as captured by the EQ-5D, from the four elective surgical 
procedures included in the PROMs programme, covering the years 2009/10 to 2012/13. See Figure 1 notes for sources of SHM data. 
Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Statistical significance after applying a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons is denoted by the underlined stars. Average EQ-5D health gains from hip and knee replacement in 
2012/13 exclude data from patients undergoing revisions to these procedures; see Figure 1 notes for more. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Correlation between change in hospital sites’ average adjusted EQ-5D health gain from 
surgery and change in AMI mortality 
 AMI mortality 
Hip 
replacement 
Knee 
replacement 
Groin 
hernia 
Varicose 
veins 
Change in acute myocardial infarction (AMI) mortality rate 1     
Hip replacement: change in average adjusted EQ-5D health gain -0.0614 1    
Knee replacement: change in average adjusted EQ-5D health gain -0.0446 0.413*** 1   
Groin hernia: change in average adjusted EQ-5D health gain 0.0901** 0.0641 -0.0606 1  
Varicose veins: change in average adjusted EQ-5D health gain -0.0709 -0.033 0.0369 0.0789* 1 
Table reports the pairwise correlations between hospital sites’ first differenced (year-to-year) mortality rate from acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI) and first differenced (year-to-year) average casemix-adjusted health gain, as captured by the EQ-5D, from the four 
elective surgical procedures included in the PROMs programme, covering the years 2009/10 to 2012/13. See Figure 2 notes for AMI 
sample restrictions. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Statistical significance after applying 
a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons is denoted by the underlined stars. Average PROMs health gains from hip and knee 
replacements include both primary procedures and revisions. 
 
 
 
Table 9: Competition indices – summary statistics 
Competition Index  Observations Average value Standard deviation Min Max 
MSOA-centred HHI  
(predicted choices) 474,572 1.0547 0.6979 0.0667 5.1651 
MSOA-centred HHI  
(actual choices) 494,867 0.5796 0.2344 0 1.5054 
GP-centred 95% radius HHI 495,347 1.2061 0.4472 0.1785 6.572 
Number of hospital sites 
within 30km 422,955 11.0321 9.8007 1 43.6667 
Table reports summary statistics for the competition indices used in this paper. All HHIs are a weighted average of the negative log 
of HHI across six high-volume elective surgical procedures – hip and knee replacement, hernia repair, varicose vein surgery, knee 
arthroscopy, and cataract repair. 
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Table 10: Correlation between different indicators of competition intensity 
 
MSOA-centred 
HHI 
(predicted) 
MSOA-
centred HHI 
(actual) 
GP-centred 
95% radius 
HHI 
No. of 
hospitals 
within 30km 
Urban 
dummy 
Pop density 
(pre-reform 
patients) 
Pop density 
(current 
patients) 
MSOA-centred HHI 
(predicted choices) 1       
MSOA-centred HHI 
(actual choices) 0.3974 1      
GP-centred 95% radius 
HHI 0.4183 0.7955 1     
Number of hospital sites 
within 30km 0.7112 0.1963 0.3582 1    
Dummy: lives in urban 
area 0.2454 0.0322 0.0577 0.2767 1   
Catchment population 
density (pre-reform 
patients) 
0.7292 0.1458 0.2061 0.7822 0.2806 1  
Catchment population 
density (current patients) 0.6198 0.0815 0.1627 0.7881 0.2828 0.9836 1 
Table reports the pairwise correlations between measures of competition intensity used in the paper, a dummy indicating that the patient 
resides in an urban area, and hospitals’ catchment area population density based on both pre-reform patient flows and current patient 
flows. All HHIs are a weighted average of the negative log of HHI across six high-volume elective surgical procedures – hip and knee 
replacement, hernia repair, varicose vein surgery, knee arthroscopy, and cataract repair. 
 
Table 11: Control variables – averages 
  Hip Replacement 
Knee 
Replacement 
Groin 
Hernia 
Varicose 
Veins 
Patient age 67.75 69.15 58.7 50.56 
Patient is female (%) 59.26 56.9 7.22 62.36 
Annual case load (site-procedure level) (current) 424 418 451 289 
Total case load (site-procedure level) (pre-reform) 793 782 1236 728 
Total annual trust admissions (current) 88,727 90,172 91,869 113,641 
Total annual trust admissions (pre-reform) 78,001 79,470 81,243 91,055 
Patient lives in an urban area (%) 71.72 75.31 75.56 80.05 
Hospital catchment area population density (current) 25.36 26.29 27.03 34.13 
Hospital catchment area population density (pre-reform) 26.89 27.84 27.68 35.03 
Charlson score 1.33 1.51 0.82 0.45 
Dummy: low severity (1 diagnosis) (%) 15 13.35 39.9 60.14 
Dummy: high severity (3 or more diagnoses) (%) 64.61 67.9 34.78 18.77 
IMD Income Deprivation score (%) 12.39 13.43 13.2 15.21 
Standard acute hospital (%) 50.64 51.74 56.36 56.66 
Treated at a specialist hospital trust (%) 4.57 3.64 0.04 0 
Treated at a teaching hospital trust (%) 12.73 12.46 13.61 21.69 
Treated at a non-teaching university hospital trust (%) 16.26 16.39 14.13 15.22 
Treated at a private hospital (%) 15.81 15.78 15.87 6.44 
Patient treated as a day case (%) N/A N/A 69.15 87.27 
Revision to primary hip or knee replacement (%) 8.29 5.15 N/A N/A 
Table reports average values of control variables used in this paper, separated by PROMs procedure. All variables expressed as 
percentages in this table are entered as proportions (between 0 and 1) in the regressions. Italicised variables are not included in the 
regressions, but instead are proxied by their pre-reform values, the averages for which are reported immediately below the italicised 
variables. ‘Annual case load (site-procedure level)’ is equal to the annual procedure-specific case load (Finished Consultant Episodes or 
FCEs) at that hospital site. It is proxied by total procedure-specific FCEs in the three financial years before the introduction of patient 
choice (2002/3-2004/5). ‘Total annual trust admissions’ is proxied by its average value over these three years. Catchment area population 
density (people per hectare) is defined as the average population density (from the 2011 census) of the Middle Super Output Areas 
(MSOAs) of residence of the hospital’s patients (for the six surgical procedures used to calculate the competition indices) in the current 
financial year. It is proxied by a measure that, instead of using patients from the current financial year, uses patients in the three years 
before the introduction of patient choice. In the regressions, the dummy variable indicating a standard acute hospital is omitted. 
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Table 12: Cross-sectional estimates: Impact of hospital competition (negative log of actual patient 
choice HHI) on casemix-adjusted health gain from elective surgery 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Procedure  Orthopaedic Surgery  Varicose Vein Stripping  All PROMs Procedures 
Casemix-Adjusted Outcome  EQ-5D  health gain 
Oxford Score  
health gain  
Aberdeen Questionnaire 
health gain  
EQ-5D  
health gain 
        Competition intensity 
(negative log HHI) 
 -0.00587 -0.366**  -0.657**   -0.00406 
 (0.00383) (0.174)  (0.271)   (0.00283) 
Annual case load  
(site-procedure level) (/106) 
 -4.669 -150.0  -899.5   -3.434 
 (7.523) (330.2)  (726.5)   (4.215) 
Annual case load squared  
(site-procedure level) (/109) 
 1.067 38.44  590.0   0.960 
 (2.835) (126.2)  (421.9)   (1.408) 
Total annual trust  
admissions (/106) 
 -0.198* -9.593**  -12.26   -0.181** 
 (0.104) (4.828)  (12.42)   (0.0835) 
Total annual trust  
admissions squared (/1012) 
 1.193** 61.86**  44.22   1.035** 
 (0.518) (23.85)  (56.44)   (0.401) 
Dummy: patient lives  
in an urban area 
 -0.00608*** -0.359***  0.0775   -0.00493*** 
 (0.00144) (0.0485)  (0.148)   (0.00111) 
Hospital catchment area 
population density (/106) 
 -6.214 -1,654  -2,790   -30.79 
 (113.0) (5,045)  (9,183)   (80.02) 
Charlson score (/103)  -0.549** 3.235  -56.07   -0.608**  (0.270) (10.12)  (60.55)   (0.242) 
Dummy: low severity  
(1 diagnosis) 
 0.000400 0.0759  0.0563   0.00103 
 (0.00223) (0.0707)  (0.160)   (0.00138) 
Dummy: high severity  
(3 or more diagnoses) 
 -0.00333** -0.111**  -0.0122   -0.00356*** 
 (0.00144) (0.0558)  (0.208)   (0.00121) 
IMD Income  
Deprivation score 
 -0.0102 -1.089***  -0.577   -0.00828 
 (0.00692) (0.272)  (0.739)   (0.00571) 
Dummy: part of a specialist  
hospital trust 
 -0.00251 0.202  -   -0.00322 
 (0.00605) (0.299)  -   (0.00500) 
Dummy: part of a teaching  
hospital trust 
 -0.00332 -0.177  0.195   -0.00154 
 (0.00444) (0.195)  (0.285)   (0.00294) 
Dummy: part of a university 
hospital trust (non-teaching) 
 -0.000444 0.0462  0.571**   0.000841 
 (0.00283) (0.131)  (0.251)   (0.00231) 
Dummy: private hospital   -0.00879 -0.373  -   -0.0110*  (0.00723) (0.227)  -   (0.00664) 
Dummy: patient  
treated as a day case 
 - -  -0.252  0.00259 
 - -  (0.175)  (0.00165) 
Dummy: knee replacement   -0.117*** -5.184***  -  -0.117***  (0.00139) (0.0652)  -  (0.00136) 
Dummy: groin hernia repair   - -  -  -0.345***  - -  -  (0.00225) 
Dummy: varicose vein 
stripping 
 - -  -  -0.332*** 
 - -  -  (0.00275) 
Dummy: revision to hip 
replacement 
 -0.140*** -7.430***  -  -0.140*** 
 (0.00361) (0.156)  -  (0.00360) 
Dummy: revision to knee 
replacement 
 -0.0565*** -4.279***  -  -0.0564*** 
 (0.00456) (0.150)  -  (0.00457) 
        Observations  195,517 215,113  22,327  277,425 
R-squared  0.068 0.101  0.017  0.283 
Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors clustered at the hospital (site) level. The coefficients on competition intensity 
give the treatment effects of interest. Competition intensity is measured as the negative log of a neighbourhood-centred, hospital-level 
HHI based on actual patient choices and averaged over six high-volume elective surgical procedures – see text for further information. 
A constant term is included, but its coefficient is not reported. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2) pool hip and knee replacement surgery observations in a single regression, while Column (4) pools all 
PROMs procedures in a single regression; dummy variables are included for all procedures except hip replacement, as well as for 
revisions to hip and knee replacement, to capture differences in the level of health gains across procedures. Some variables (marked in 
the table) are divided by a power of 10 to ease reporting of very small coefficients. A missing coefficient indicates that Stata dropped 
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the variable due to multicollinearity. ‘Annual case load’ is equal to the number of finished consultant episodes (FCEs) for the hospital 
(site) and surgical procedure in question. ‘Total annual trust admissions’ is equal to the total number of admissions for the hospital 
trust in question. Annual case load and its quadratic are proxied by total procedure-specific FCEs and its quadratic in the three 
financial years before the introduction of patient choice (2002/3-2004/5), while total annual trust admissions and its quadratic are 
proxied by their average values over these three years. ‘Hospital catchment area population density’ is measured in people per hectare, 
and is calculated at the hospital site level. It is equal to the average population density (persons per hectare) across each patient’s 
Middle Super Output Area of residence, averaging over the three financial years before the introduction of patient choice (2002/3-
2004/5) and the six surgical procedures used to construct the competition indices used in this paper. The Charlson score indicates the 
patient’s 10-year survival probability based on their health status in relation to 17 conditions likely to lead to death. The IMD income 
deprivation score measures the percentage of households in the patient’s Lower Super Output Area of residence that are income 
deprived. All regressions also include the following control variables, the coefficients for which are not reported: casemix dummies with 
gender interacted with five-year age bins; dummies for the nine regions of England (including London) crossed with financial year; and 
dummies for day of week and month of year. 
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Table 13: First-stage estimates with pre-reform HHI instrument: Impact of hospital competition 
(negative log of predicted patient choice HHI) on casemix-adjusted health gain from surgery 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
First Stage Outcome  Current-period competition intensity (negative log HHI) 
Procedure  Orthopaedic Surgery  Varicose Vein Stripping  All PROMs Procedures 
Second Stage (Casemix-
Adjusted) Outcome  
EQ-5D  
health gain 
Oxford Score  
health gain  
Aberdeen Questionnaire 
health gain  
EQ-5D  
health gain 
        Pre-reform average 
competition intensity 
 0.944*** 0.945***  0.964***  0.940*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0232)  (0.0334)  (0.0235) 
Annual case load  
(site-procedure level) (/106) 
 193.5*** 193.9***  98.88  76.54** 
 (48.43) (48.43)  (95.18)  (34.17) 
Annual case load squared  
(site-procedure level) (/109) 
 -83.32*** -83.65***  -10.20  -23.27 
 (21.42) (21.38)  (65.21)  (16.18) 
Total annual trust  
admissions (/106) 
 -1.818* -1.798*  -1.772  -2.072** 
 (0.936) (0.937)  (1.304)  (0.907) 
Total annual trust  
admissions squared (/1012) 
 6.809 6.728  4.176  7.978* 
 (4.447) (4.448)  (6.561)  (4.414) 
Dummy: patient lives  
in an urban area 
 0.0125** 0.0123**  0.00907  0.0129** 
 (0.00544) (0.00544)  (0.00835)  (0.00598) 
Hospital catchment area 
population density (/106) 
 2,103*** 2,099***  3,799***  2,123*** 
 (793.0) (790.9)  (1,222)  (743.7) 
Charlson score (/103)  -0.254 -0.262  0.0268  -0.284  (0.339) (0.342)  (0.662)  (0.330) 
Dummy: low severity  
(1 diagnosis) 
 0.00555 0.00568  0.00253  0.00401 
 (0.00496) (0.00500)  (0.00651)  (0.00364) 
Dummy: high severity  
(3 or more diagnoses) 
 0.00622 0.00623  -0.00206  0.00791** 
 (0.00395) (0.00398)  (0.00308)  (0.00349) 
IMD Income  
Deprivation score 
 -0.0393* -0.0389*  -0.00780  -0.0300 
 (0.0203) (0.0202)  (0.0188)  (0.0194) 
Dummy: part of a specialist  
hospital trust 
 -0.162*** -0.161***  -  -0.195*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0519)  -  (0.0600) 
Dummy: part of a teaching  
hospital trust 
 -0.0760** -0.0760**  -0.0491  -0.0704** 
 (0.0322) (0.0321)  (0.0327)  (0.0294) 
Dummy: part of a university 
hospital trust (non-teaching) 
 -0.0883*** -0.0879***  -0.114***  -0.0885*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0219)  (0.0422)  (0.0218) 
Dummy: private hospital  
 0.960*** 0.956***  -  1.004*** 
 (0.149) (0.149)  -  (0.119) 
Dummy: patient  
treated as a day case 
 - -  0.00946   0.00258 
 - -  (0.0111)   (0.00555) 
Dummy: knee replacement   -0.00270 -0.00328*  -   0.00111  (0.00202) (0.00199)  -   (0.00201) 
Dummy: groin hernia repair   - -  -   -0.0106  - -  -   (0.0137) 
Dummy: varicose vein 
stripping 
 - -  -   -0.0105 
 - -  -   (0.0124) 
Dummy: revision to hip 
replacement 
 0.00379 0.00301  -   0.00241 
 (0.00330) (0.00327)  -   (0.00372) 
Dummy: revision to knee 
replacement 
 0.00769 0.00824*  -   0.00522 
 (0.00514) (0.00498)  -   (0.00523) 
        Observations  195,314 214,904  22,327  276,980 
Table reports first-stage estimates from instrumental variables estimation of the effect of hospital competition on casemix-adjusted 
health gain from elective surgery, where competition intensity is instrumented by its average level in the three financial years before 
the introduction of patient choice of hospital (2002/3 to 2004/5). The first stage for different outcome variables within a given surgical 
procedure involves running exactly the same regression, but each yields slightly different results because some observations will be 
included in one regression but not others due to survey non-completion. A constant term is included, but its coefficient is not reported. 
Standard errors clustered at the hospital (site) level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Competition intensity is measured as the negative log of an MSOA-centred, hospital-level HHI based on 
predicted patient choices and averaged over six high-volume elective surgical procedures – see text for further information. See Table 
12 notes for further information, all of which also applies unless it contradicts information provided here. 
 
 
  43 
Table 14: Second-stage estimates with pre-reform HHI instrument: Impact of hospital competition 
(negative log of predicted patient choice HHI) on casemix-adjusted health gain from surgery 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
First Stage Outcome  Current-period competition intensity (negative log HHI) 
Procedure  Orthopaedic Surgery  Varicose Vein Stripping  All PROMs Procedures 
Second Stage (Casemix-
Adjusted) Outcome 
 EQ-5D  
health gain 
Oxford Score  
health gain 
 Aberdeen Questionnaire 
health gain 
 EQ-5D  
health gain 
        Competition intensity 
(negative log HHI) 
 -0.00756* -0.458**  -0.690**  -0.00556* 
 (0.00415) (0.186)  (0.277)  (0.00306) 
Annual case load  
(site-procedure level) (/106) 
 -5.620 -187.2  -902.5  -3.842 
 (7.635) (336.7)  (725.4)  (4.251) 
Annual case load squared  
(site-procedure level) (/109) 
 1.415 52.71  591.9  1.063 
 (2.867) (128.4)  (422.0)  (1.413) 
Total annual trust  
admissions (/106) 
 -0.208** -10.16**  -12.38  -0.191** 
 (0.105) (4.906)  (12.47)  (0.0839) 
Total annual trust  
admissions squared (/1012) 
 1.264** 65.44***  44.85  1.096*** 
 (0.522) (24.22)  (56.75)  (0.404) 
Dummy: patient lives  
in an urban area 
 -0.00586*** -0.349***  0.0812  -0.00473*** 
 (0.00143) (0.0483)  (0.149)  (0.00111) 
Hospital catchment area 
population density (/106) 
 19.28 -266.0  -2,208  -7.683 
 (112.4) (5,056)  (9,402)  (80.66) 
Charlson score (/103)  -0.565** 2.908  -56.04  -0.625*** 
 (0.269) (10.11)  (60.27)  (0.241) 
Dummy: low severity  
(1 diagnosis) 
 0.000417 0.0765  0.0563  0.00105 
 (0.00222) (0.0703)  (0.159)  (0.00138) 
Dummy: high severity  
(3 or more diagnoses) 
 -0.00329** -0.110**  -0.0124  -0.00353*** 
 (0.00143) (0.0557)  (0.207)  (0.00121) 
IMD Income  
Deprivation score 
 -0.0106 -1.112***  -0.578  -0.00855 
 (0.00691) (0.271)  (0.736)  (0.00572) 
Dummy: part of a specialist  
hospital trust 
 -0.00274 0.184  -  -0.00346 
 (0.00593) (0.293)  -  (0.00485) 
Dummy: part of a teaching  
hospital trust 
 -0.00354 -0.194  0.187  -0.00182 
 (0.00445) (0.194)  (0.281)  (0.00296) 
Dummy: part of a university 
hospital trust (non-teaching) 
 -0.000770 0.0279  0.563**  0.000534 
 (0.00284) (0.130)  (0.256)  (0.00234) 
Dummy: private hospital   -0.00871 -0.360  -  -0.0107* 
 (0.00712) (0.221)  -  (0.00650) 
Dummy: patient  
treated as a day case 
 - -  -0.251  0.00256 
 - -  (0.174)  (0.00165) 
Dummy: knee replacement   -0.117*** -5.184***  -  -0.117*** 
 (0.00139) (0.0650)  -  (0.00136) 
Dummy: groin hernia repair   - -  -  -0.345*** 
 - -  -  (0.00225) 
Dummy: varicose vein 
stripping 
 - -  -  -0.332*** 
 - -  -  (0.00275) 
Dummy: revision to hip 
replacement 
 -0.140*** -7.437***  -  -0.140*** 
 (0.00361) (0.155)  -  (0.00361) 
Dummy: revision to knee 
replacement 
 -0.0565*** -4.279***  -  -0.0564*** 
 (0.00455) (0.150)  -  (0.00456) 
        Observations  195,314 214,904  22,327  276,980 
R-squared  0.0684 0.101   0.0166   0.283 
Table reports second-stage estimates from instrumental variables estimation of the effect of hospital competition on casemix-adjusted 
health gain from elective surgery, where competition intensity is instrumented by its average level in the three financial years before 
the introduction of patient choice of hospital (2002/3 to 2004/5). The coefficients on (instrumented) competition intensity give the 
treatment effects of interest. A constant term is included, but its coefficient is not reported. Standard errors clustered at the hospital 
(site) level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Competition 
intensity is measured as the negative log of an MSOA-centred, hospital-level HHI based on predicted patient choices and averaged over 
six high-volume elective surgical procedures – see text for further information. See Table 12 notes for further information, all of which 
also applies unless it contradicts information provided here. 
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Table 15: Impact of hospital competition (negative log of predicted patient choice HHI) on 
casemix-adjusted health gain from hip and knee replacement surgery 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Procedure  Hip Replacement  Knee Replacement 
Casemix-Adjusted 
Outcome 
 EQ-5D  
health gain 
Oxford Score  
health gain 
 EQ-5D  
health gain 
Oxford Score  
health gain 
       Competition intensity 
(negative log HHI) 
 -0.00804 -0.514**   -0.00869* -0.494** 
 (0.00508) (0.233)   (0.00499) (0.221) 
Table reports second-stage estimates from instrumental variables estimation of the effect of hospital competition on casemix-adjusted 
health gain from hip and knee replacement surgery, where competition intensity is instrumented by its average level in the three financial 
years before the introduction of patient choice of hospital (2002/3 to 2004/5). Standard errors clustered at the hospital (site) level are 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Competition intensity is measured 
as the negative log of an MSOA-centred, hospital-level HHI based on predicted patient choices and averaged over six high-volume elective 
surgical procedures – see text for further information. See Table 12 notes for further information, all of which also applies unless it 
contradicts information provided here. 
 
 
Table 16: Impact of hospital competition (negative log of predicted patient choice HHI) on 
casemix-adjusted health gain from surgery: Other outcome measures 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Procedure  Groin 
Hernia 
Varicose 
Vein 
 Orthopaedic 
Surgery  
Groin 
Hernia 
Varicose 
Vein 
All 
PROMs 
Hip 
Replacement 
Knee 
Replacement 
Casemix-Adjusted 
Outcome 
 EQ–5D Index Score  EQ – Visual Analogue Score 
           
Competition intensity 
(negative log HHI) 
 -0.00130 -0.00227  -0.235 0.0171 -0.208 -0.158 -0.152 -0.374 
 (0.00229) (0.00515)  (0.249) (0.184) (0.349) (0.184) (0.299) (0.292) 
Table reports second-stage estimates from instrumental variables estimation of the effect of hospital competition on casemix-adjusted 
health gain from elective surgery as captured by alternative PROMs indicators, where competition intensity is instrumented by its 
average level in the three financial years before the introduction of patient choice of hospital (2002/3 to 2004/5). Standard errors clustered 
at the hospital (site) level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Competition intensity is measured as the negative log of an MSOA-centred, hospital-level HHI based on predicted patient choices and 
averaged over six high-volume elective surgical procedures – see text for further information. See Table 12 notes for further information, 
all of which also applies unless it contradicts information provided here. 
 
 
Table 17: Impact of hospital competition (negative log of predicted patient choice HHI) on 
casemix-adjusted health gain from surgery: Alternative competition indices 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Procedure  Orthopaedic Surgery  Varicose Vein Stripping  All PROMs Procedures 
Casemix-Adjusted Outcome  EQ-5D  
health gain 
Oxford Score  
health gain 
 Aberdeen Questionnaire 
health gain 
 EQ-5D  
health gain 
        (1) MSOA-centred, hospital-level 
HHI (actual patient choices) 
 -0.0221* -1.470***   -0.0719   -0.0143 
 (0.0117) (0.497)   (0.974)   (0.00893) 
(2) GP-centred, hospital-level 
95% radius HHI 
 -0.00546 -0.486**  -0.445  -0.00300 
 (0.00426) (0.198)  (0.679)  (0.00355) 
(3) Competition = number of 
competitors within 30km 
 -0.000355 -0.0272  -0.0534**  -0.000219 
 (0.000375) (0.0181)  (0.0227)  (0.000305) 
Table reports robustness tests of the second-stage estimates reported in Table 14 using alternative indicators of competition intensity. 
Standard errors clustered at the hospital (site) level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Table 12 notes for further information, all of which also applies unless it contradicts information 
provided here. Row (1) uses an HHI based on actual patient choices rather than predicted patient choices. Row (2) uses a GP-centred, 
hospital-level 95% radius HHI. Row (3) defines competition as being equal to the number of competitor hospitals within a 30km radius. 
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Table 18: Impact of hospital competition (negative log of predicted patient choice HHI) on 
casemix-adjusted health gain from surgery: Robustness tests 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Procedure  Orthopaedic Surgery  Varicose Vein Stripping  All PROMs Procedures 
Casemix-Adjusted Outcome  EQ-5D  
health gain 
Oxford Score  
health gain 
 Aberdeen Questionnaire 
health gain 
 EQ-5D  
health gain 
        
(1) Omit all London observations  -0.00864* -0.466**  -0.686**  -0.00633*  (0.00445) (0.203)  (0.310)  (0.00329) 
(2) Include control for Foundation 
Trust status 
 -0.00746* -0.460**  -0.661**  -0.00564* 
 (0.00413) (0.188)  (0.287)  (0.00307) 
(3) Restrict to NHS hospitals  -0.00739* -0.456**  -0.690**  -0.00543*  (0.00416) (0.186)  (0.277)  (0.00307) 
(4) Don’t interact year and region 
of England controls 
 -0.00675 -0.424**  -0.664**  -0.00493 
 (0.00422) (0.189)  (0.282)  (0.00312) 
(5) No urban status control,  
no population density control 
 -0.00875** -0.546***  -0.700***  -0.00683*** 
 (0.00357) (0.160)  (0.225)  (0.00262) 
(6) No population density control  -0.00732** -0.461***   -0.716***   -0.00566**  (0.00359) (0.161)   (0.231)   (0.00263) 
(7) No urban status control  -0.00862** -0.521***  -0.676**  -0.00645**  (0.00415) (0.187)  (0.274)  (0.00306) 
(8) Population density based on 
current patient flows 
 -0.00770* -0.464**  -0.701**  -0.00561* 
 (0.00421) (0.189)  (0.282)  (0.00314) 
(9) Instrument all scale effects 
variables 
 -0.00535 -0.391**  -0.626**  -0.00470 
 (0.00443) (0.188)  (0.287)  (0.00322) 
(10) Omit hospital scale effects 
variables 
 -0.00425 -0.294  -0.686**  -0.00337 
 (0.00420) (0.183)  (0.273)  (0.00318) 
(11) All non-binary variables 
logged 
 -0.00418* -0.00697**  -0.00669**  -0.00349* 
 (0.00251) (0.00330)  (0.00296)  (0.00201) 
(12) Include hospital fixed effects 
 0.000796 0.131  0.521  0.000205 
 (0.00262) (0.0969)  (0.515)  (0.00196) 
Table reports robustness tests of the second-stage estimates reported in Table 14, from instrumental variables estimation of the effect 
of hospital competition on casemix-adjusted health gain from elective surgery, where competition intensity is instrumented by its 
average level in the three financial years before the introduction of patient choice of hospital (2002/3 to 2004/5). Standard errors 
clustered at the hospital (site) level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. See Table 12 notes for further information, all of which also applies unless it contradicts information provided here. Row (1) 
omits all observations from London hospitals. Row (2) includes a control for Foundation Trust status. Row (3) omits all observations 
in which the patient attended a private hospital. Row (4) includes separate year and region of England dummies, as opposed to 
interacting these dummies, as is the case in the main specification. Row (5) omits controls for patient’s urban status and hospital 
catchment area population density; Row (6) omits only the population density control, while Row (7) omits only the urban status 
control. Row (8) uses a population density control based on current patient flows, as opposed to patient flows in the three years before 
the introduction of patient choice (2002/3-2004/5). Row (9) instruments total trust admissions and procedure-specific hospital site 
admissions with their pre-reform average values, as opposed to using pre-reform average values as proxies for current-period values. To 
address estimation problems (high collinearity between instruments), the estimates reported in Row (9) omit the quadratic procedure-
specific and trust-wide scale effects controls. Row (10) omits hospital scale effects controls (total trust admissions, procedure-specific 
hospital site admissions, and their respective quadratic terms) altogether. Row (11) enters any non-binary variables in logs, while Row 
(12) includes hospital (site) fixed effects.  
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Table 19: Impact of hospital competition (negative log of predicted patient choice HHI) on 
casemix-adjusted health gain from surgery: Time trends 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Procedure  Orthopaedic Surgery  Varicose Vein Stripping  All PROMs Procedures 
Casemix-Adjusted Outcome  EQ-5D  
health gain 
Oxford Score  
health gain 
 Aberdeen Questionnaire 
health gain 
 EQ-5D  
health gain 
        Competition intensity (negative 
log HHI) 
 -0.0100* -0.513**   -0.407   -0.00755* 
 (0.00597) (0.236)   (0.341)   (0.00428) 
Competition intensity interacted 
with time trend 
 0.00161 0.0357   -0.219   0.00132 
 (0.00204) (0.0734)   (0.158)   (0.00156) 
Table reports robustness tests of the second-stage estimates reported in Table 14 when an additional term is included interacting 
current-period competition intensity with a linear time trend from 2009/10 (t = 0) to 2012/13 (t = 3). This interaction term, as well 
as current period competition intensity, are instrumented by pre-reform average competition intensity, as well as by an interaction 
term between pre-reform average competition intensity and a linear time trend from 2009/10 to 2012/13. The coefficient on both 
excluded variables is reported. Standard errors clustered at the hospital (site) level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance 
is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Table 12 notes for further information, all of which also applies unless it 
contradicts information provided here. 
 
 
Table A1: Minimum and maximum values of post-operative health status scores 
Outcome variable Adjusted min Scale min Observed min Observed max Scale max Adjusted max 
EQ-5D Index Score -0.594 -0.594 -0.594 1 1 2.323 
EQ-5D Visual Analogue Score 0 0 0 100 100 183.734 
Oxford Hip Score 0 0 0 48 48 77.678 
Oxford Knee Score 0 0 0 48 48 101.483 
Aberdeen Varicose Vein Questionnaire 14.387 0.342 13.362 100 100 152.908 
Table reports minimum and maximum Q2 (post-operative) values of PROMs studied in this paper, before and after casemix adjustment. 
The “Scale min” and “Scale max” columns report the minimum and maximum possible values of each PROM before adjustment. Unlike 
the other PROMs used in this paper, for the Aberdeen Varicose Vein Questionnaire (AVVQ), a higher score denotes worse health status. 
In this paper, including in Table A1, the AVVQ score is reversed, so that 0 denotes the worst possible health state, and 100 denotes 
perfect health. More precisely, the worst possible health state is 0.342, due to rounding of the weights used for each question.  
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Table A2: Coefficients from final stage of risk adjustment of post-operative PROMs scores: 
Orthopaedic surgery 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Procedure  Hip Replacement – 
Primary 
 Hip Replacement – 
Revision 
 Knee Replacement – 
Primary 
 Knee Replacement – 
Revision 
Casemix-Adjusted 
Outcome  EQ-5D 
Oxford 
Score  EQ-5D 
Oxford 
Score  EQ-5D 
Oxford 
Score  EQ-5D 
Oxford 
Score 
             Pre-treatment (Q1) 
score 
 
 0.446** 0.360**  0.188** 0.503**  0.634** 0.517**  0.850** 0.720** 
 (0.0214) (0.0127)  (0.00888) (0.0365)  (0.0278) (0.0152)  (0.102) (0.0572) 
Pre-treatment (Q1) 
score squared 
 
 -0.180** -0.00472**  - -0.00441**  -0.256** -0.00600**  -0.327** -0.00772** 
 (0.0112) (0.000277)  - (0.000706)  (0.0143) (0.000318)  (0.0532) (0.00139) 
Dummy: Female 
 
 -0.0157** -1.017**  - -0.644**  -0.0100** -0.745**  0.0221** 0.508** 
 (0.00122) (0.0462)  - (0.169)  (0.00148) (0.0508)  (0.00757) (0.250) 
Dummy: Q1 assisted 
 
 0.0123** -  - -  0.0056** 0.218**  - - 
 (0.00202) -  - -  (0.00191) (0.0657)  - - 
Dummy: Q2 assisted 
 
 -0.0570** -1.234**  -0.0500** -0.440  -0.0546** -1.154**  -0.0945** -2.385** 
 (0.00305) (0.0923)  (0.0110) (0.294)  (0.00284) (0.106)  (0.0127) (0.428) 
Dummy: Living 
alone at time of Q1 
survey 
 
 - -  - -  -0.0036** -  - - 
 - -  - -  (0.00145) -  - - 
Dummy: Living 
alone at time of Q2 
survey 
 
 - -  - -   -  - - 
 - -  - -   -  - - 
Dummy: Disabled at 
time of Q1 survey 
 0.00599** 0.428**   0.958**  0.00875*
* 
1.076**  0.0178* 1.054** 
 (0.00140) (0.0517)   (0.236)  (0.00151) (0.0565)  (0.00918) (0.318) 
Dummy: Disabled at 
time of Q2 survey  
 -0.248** -8.838**  -0.233** -9.399**  -0.223** -8.873**  -0.239** -9.439** 
 (0.00164) (0.0676)  (0.00523) (0.220)  (0.00177) (0.0692)  (0.00728) (0.252) 
Dummy: Previous 
surgery on body part 
 
 - -0.998**  -0.0436** -1.250**  - -0.887**  - - 
 - (0.147)  (0.0105) (0.369)  - (0.126)  - - 
Dummy: Heart 
disease 
 
 - -0.196**  - -  -0.0071** -0.378**  - -0.757* 
 - (0.0824)  - -  (0.00225) (0.0700)  - (0.399) 
Dummy: High blood 
pressure 
 
 - -  - -  0.00337*
* 
0.163**  - - 
 - -  - -  (0.00129) (0.0431)  - - 
Dummy: Stroke 
 
 - -  - -  -0.0140** -0.538**  - - 
 - -  - -  (0.00566) (0.206)  - - 
Dummy: Poor 
circulation 
 
 -0.0448** -2.346**  -0.0420** -2.212**  -0.0425** -2.207**  -0.0502** -1.764** 
 (0.00303) (0.104)  (0.0127) (0.357)  (0.00281) (0.0976)  (0.0121) (0.394) 
Dummy: Lung 
disease 
 
 -0.00770** -  - -  - -  - -0.663* 
 (0.00258) -  - -  - -  - (0.400) 
Dummy: Diabetes 
 
 - -0.435**  - -  -0.0067** -0.713**  - - 
 - (0.0876)  - -  (0.00216) (0.0728)  - - 
Dummy: Kidney 
disease 
 0.00926* -  - -  - -  - - 
 (0.00538) -  - -  - -  - - 
Dummy: Nervous 
system diseases 
 
 - -  - -  -0.0278** -  -0.0885** - 
 - -  - -  (0.00831) -  (0.0309) - 
Dummy: Liver 
disease 
 
 - -  - -2.764**  - -  - - 
 - -  - (1.124)  - -  - - 
Dummy: Cancer 
 
 - -  - -  - -  - - 
 - -  - -  - -  - - 
Dummy: Depression 
 
 -0.102** -1.816**  -0.124** -2.855**  -0.0965** -1.534**  -0.105** -1.683** 
 (0.00316) (0.101)  (0.0120) (0.384)  (0.00280) (0.0901)  (0.0144) (0.375) 
Dummy: Arthritis 
 
 -0.0142** -0.189**  -0.0156** -0.657**  -0.0083** 0.0944**  - 0.587** 
 (0.00120) (0.0422)  (0.00568) (0.171)  (0.00140) (0.0478)  - (0.245) 
Age 
 
 - 0.0772**  - -  0.0103** 0.402**  0.00422** 0.389** 
 - (0.0171)  - -  (0.00079
9) 
(0.0328)  (0.000393) (0.122) 
Age Squared 
 
 - -0.000710**  - -  -5.7e-5** -0.00244**  - -0.00183** 
 - (0.000134)  - -  (5.7e-6) (0.000237)  - (0.000912) 
Dummy: Mixed 
ethnicity 
 
 - -  - -  - -  -0.166** -4.636** 
 - -  - -  - -  (0.0764) (1.870) 
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Dummy: Asian 
ethnicity 
 
 -0.0563** -3.697**  - -3.659**  -0.0212** -2.166**  - - 
 (0.0137) (0.492)  - (1.018)  (0.00605) (0.197)  - - 
Dummy: Black 
ethnicity 
 
 -0.0311** -2.829**  - -  -0.0271** -2.509**  - - 
 (0.0118) (0.412)  - -  (0.00743) (0.300)  - - 
Dummy: Other 
ethnicity 
 
 - -1.072**  - -  - -1.141**  - - 
 - (0.382)  - -  - (0.453)  - - 
Dummy: Unknown 
ethnicity 
 
 0.00765** 0.423**  - -  0.0107** 0.253**  - - 
 (0.00262) (0.0838)  - -  (0.00297) (0.0958)  - - 
Charlson score 
 
 - 0.0276**  -0.00164 -  -0.0021** -  - - 
 - (0.0121)  (0.00132) -  (0.00032) -  - - 
Dummy: Day case 
 
 - -  0.209** -  - -  - - 
 - -  (0.0221) -  - -  - - 
Dummy: One HES  
comorbidity 
 
 -0.00480** -0.181**  - -  -0.0033** -0.0686  - - 
 (0.00187) (0.0652)  - -  (0.00159) (0.0531)  - - 
Dummy: Two HES 
comorbidities 
 
 -0.0114** -0.464**  - -  - -  - - 
 (0.00182) (0.0662)  - -  - -  - - 
Dummy: Three plus 
HES comorbidities 
 
 -0.0236** -0.887**  - -  -0.0120** -0.464**  - - 
 (0.00191) (0.0709)  - -  (0.00170) (0.0554)  - - 
Dummy: Self-
discharge 
 
 - -  - -  -0.0195** -0.945**  - - 
 - -  - -  (0.00847) (0.305)  - - 
IMD overall score 
 
 -7.44e-4** -0.0420**  -0.00122** -0.0529**  -7.7e-4** -0.0412**  -0.00128** -0.0665** 
 (5.79e-5) (0.00201)  (0.000212) (0.00761)  (5.0e-5) (0.00185)  (0.000268) (0.00971) 
Dummy: Malunion 
of fracture 
 -0.0722** -2.707**  - -  - -  - - 
 (0.0176) (0.584)  - -  - -  - - 
Dummy: Rheumatic 
arthritis 
 -0.0754** -  - -  - 3.114**  - - 
 (0.0129) -  - -  - (0.260)  - - 
Dummy: General 
arthritis 
 - -  - -  -0.0138** -  - - 
 - -  - -  (0.00325) -  - - 
Dummy: Mechanical 
complications 
 - -  0.0442** 1.928**  -0.172** -  0.0263** 1.412** 
 - -  (0.00594) (0.225)  (0.0671) -  (0.00789) (0.221) 
Dummy: 
Coxarthrosis 
 0.0176** 0.349**  - 1.401**  - -  - 4.301** 
 (0.00214) (0.0807)  - (0.449)  - -  - (1.552) 
Dummy: Arthrosis  - -  - -  - -  - - 
 - -  - -  - -  - - 
Dummy: Unspecified 
joint disorder 
 - -  0.173** 7.936**  - -  - -4.201** 
 - -  (0.0220) (1.751)  - -  - (0.353) 
Dummy: Fracture  - -     - -  - - 
 - -     - -  - - 
Dummy: Symptoms 
period 1-5 years 
 
 -0.00967** -0.430**  -0.0338** -1.493**  - -  -0.0542** -3.124** 
 (0.00145) (0.0534)  (0.00721) (0.237)  - -  (0.0113) (0.401) 
Dummy: Symptoms 
period 6-10 years 
 
 -0.0193** -0.780**  -0.0588** -2.485**  - 0.557**  -0.0597** -3.419** 
 (0.00244) (0.0919)  (0.0112) (0.323)  - (0.0575)  (0.0125) (0.404) 
Dummy: Symptoms 
period 10 plus years 
 
 -0.0238** -0.876**  -0.0415** -2.025**  0.00693*
* 
0.594**  -0.0677** -3.417** 
 (0.00292) (0.106)  (0.00822) (0.268)  (0.00155) (0.0588)  (0.0126) (0.447) 
            Observations  115,816 127,831  9,317 10,392  126,165 137,919  6,192 6,771 
R-squared  0.373 0.368  0.358 0.417  0.349 0.370  0.376 0.428 
Table reports coefficients from the second stage of risk-adjustment of post-treatment PROMs scores as outlined in Appendix 1. The 
second stage regressions only include variables found to be statistically significant at the 5 per cent level in the first stage of the risk 
adjustment exercise; coefficients from first stage regressions available on request. Regressions include hospital site fixed effects and a 
constant, the coefficient on which is not reported. Standard errors clustered at the hospital (site) level are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance is reported as follows: ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables in italics are derived from PROMs dataset, while variables 
not in italics are derived from HES. Variables are listed in the table even when not included in any of the reported regressions, in order 
to indicate that they were included in the first stage but found to have a statistically insignificant effect. The list of variables included 
in the risk adjustment exercise is identical to that used by NHS for risk-adjustment of Trust-level average PROMs scores (NHS 
England 2013b). An identical risk adjustment exercise is conducted for the EQ-VAS outcome variable; coefficients available on request. 
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Table A3: Coefficients from final stage of risk adjustment of post-operative PROMs scores:  
Groin hernia repair and varicose vein stripping 
  (1)  (2) (3) 
Procedure  Groin Hernia Repair  Varicose Vein Stripping 
Casemix-Adjusted Outcome  EQ-5D  EQ-5D Aberdeen Varicose Vein Questionnaire 
      Pre-treatment (Q1) score 
 
 0.237**  0.432** 0.674** 
 (0.00439)  (0.0437) (0.0650) 
Pre-treatment (Q1) score 
squared 
 
 -  -0.0506** -0.00117** 
 -  (0.0166) (0.000419) 
Dummy: Female 
 
 -0.0224**  -0.0179** -1.346** 
 (0.00237)  (0.00227) (0.110) 
Dummy: Q1 assisted 
 
 0.0109**  - - 
 (0.00246)  - - 
Dummy: Q2 assisted 
 
 -0.0439**  -0.0319** -0.774** 
 (0.00403)  (0.00814) (0.347) 
Dummy: Living alone at 
time of Q1 survey 
 
 -0.00653**  - - 
 (0.00168)  - - 
Dummy: Living alone at 
time of Q2 survey 
 
 -  -0.0128** -0.393** 
 -  (0.00304) (0.161) 
Dummy: Disabled at time 
of Q1 survey 
 -0.0466**  -0.0551** - 
 (0.00304)  (0.00605) - 
Dummy: Disabled at time 
of Q2 survey  
 -0.172**  -0.190** -3.485** 
 (0.00320)  (0.00659) (0.246) 
Dummy: Previous surgery 
on body part 
 
 0.00245**  -0.0211** -2.470** 
 (0.00118)  (0.00224) (0.122) 
Dummy: Heart disease 
 
 -  - - 
 -  - - 
Dummy: High blood 
pressure 
 
 -  - - 
 -  - - 
Dummy: Stroke 
 
 0.0182**  - - 
 (0.00567)  - - 
Dummy: Poor circulation 
 
 -0.0443**  -0.0421** -1.420** 
 (0.00395)  (0.00360) (0.170) 
Dummy: Lung disease 
 
 -  - - 
 -  - - 
Dummy: Diabetes 
 
 0.00921**  - - 
 (0.00288)  - - 
Dummy: Kidney disease  -  - - 
 -  - - 
Dummy: Nervous system 
diseases 
 
 -0.0230**  - - 
 (0.00754)  - - 
Dummy: Liver disease 
 
 0.0310**  0.0325** -1.843* 
 (0.0109)  (0.0157) (0.970) 
Dummy: Cancer 
 
 -  - - 
 -  - - 
Dummy: Depression 
 
 -0.0856**  -0.0775** -0.666** 
 (0.00397)  (0.00551) (0.224) 
Dummy: Arthritis 
 
 -0.0358**  -0.0279** - 
 (0.00172)  (0.00347) - 
Age 
 
 -  - - 
 -  - - 
Age Squared 
 
 -  5.22e-06** - 
 -  (9.76e-07) - 
Dummy: Mixed ethnicity 
 
 -  - - 
 -  - - 
Dummy: Asian ethnicity 
 
 -0.0503**  -0.0415** -2.849** 
 (0.00552)  (0.0104) (0.492) 
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Dummy: Black ethnicity 
 
 -0.0263**  - - 
 (0.00787)  - - 
Dummy: Other ethnicity 
 
 -0.0240**  -0.0368** -2.500** 
 (0.00858)  (0.0120) (0.526) 
Dummy: Unknown 
ethnicity 
 
 0.00236  - - 
 (0.00171)  - - 
Charlson score 
 
 -0.000827*  - - 
 (0.000424)  - - 
Dummy: Day case 
 
 0.00412**  - - 
 (0.00151)  - - 
Dummy: One HES  
comorbidity 
 
 -0.000339  -0.0106** - 
 (0.00126)  (0.00278) - 
Dummy: Two HES 
comorbidities 
 
 -0.000459  -0.0220** - 
 (0.00161)  (0.00434) - 
Dummy: Three plus HES 
comorbidities 
 
 -0.00491**  -0.0245** -0.255 
 (0.00191)  (0.00446) (0.248) 
Dummy: Self-discharge 
 
 -  - - 
 -  - - 
IMD overall score 
 
 -0.000556**  -0.000601** -0.0164** 
 (5.30e-05)  (9.73e-05) (0.00465) 
Dummy: Symptoms period 
1-5 years 
 
 -  - - 
 -  - - 
Dummy: Symptoms period 
6-10 years 
 
 -  - - 
 -  - - 
Dummy: Symptoms period 
10 plus years 
 
 -  - - 
 -  - - 
Dummy: Symptoms period 
1 plus years 
 -0.00629**  - - 
 (0.00110)  - - 
      Observations  79,466  25,935 27,426 
R-squared  0.351  0.423 0.403 
Table reports coefficients from the second stage of risk-adjustment of post-treatment PROMs scores as outlined in Appendix 1. The 
second stage regressions only include variables found to be statistically significant at the 5 per cent level in the first stage of the risk 
adjustment exercise; coefficients from first stage regressions available on request. Regressions include hospital site fixed effects and a 
constant, the coefficient on which is not reported. Standard errors clustered at the hospital (site) level are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance is reported as follows: ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables in italics are derived from PROMs dataset, while variables 
not in italics are derived from HES. Variables are listed in the table even when not included in any of the reported regressions, in order 
to indicate that they were included in the first stage but found to have a statistically insignificant effect. The list of variables included in 
the risk adjustment exercise is identical to that used by NHS for risk-adjustment of Trust-level average PROMs scores (NHS England 
2013b). An identical risk adjustment exercise is conducted for the EQ-VAS outcome variable; coefficients available on request. The first 
stage risk adjustment regressions for groin hernia repair include a dummy variable indicating a symptoms period of 1 plus years and 
omitting the other symptoms period dummies, while for varicose vein stripping the other three symptoms period dummies are included 
and the 1 plus years dummy is omitted. 
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Table A4: Trust-Level Regressions of Log of Standardised Hospital Mortality on  
Log of Average EQ-5D Health Gain 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable   Log of Trusts’ Standardised Hospital Mortality 
Explanatory Variable 
Casemix-Adjusted?   No  Yes 
Procedure On Which 
Explanatory Variable Is Based  Hip Knee Groin Vein  Hip Knee Groin Vein 
                      Log of Trusts’ Average EQ-5D 
Health Gain 
 0.191*** 0.0903**
* 
0.0230**
* 
0.00591  -0.0121 0.0853** -0.00510 0.0344** 
 (0.0362) (0.0298) (0.00850) (0.00792)  (0.0531) (0.0383) (0.0151) (0.0146) 
           Observations  554 554 568 452   533 542 532 256 
R-squared   0.048 0.016 0.013 0.001   0.000 0.009 0.000 0.021 
Table reports coefficients from univariate regression of log of Hospital Trusts’ Standardised Hospital Mortality on log of Hospital 
Trusts’ Unadjusted or Casemix-Adjusted Average EQ-5D Health Gain. See Figure 1 notes for SHM sources. Average EQ-5D health 
gains from hip and knee replacement in 2012/13 exclude data from patients undergoing revisions to these procedures; see Figure 1 
notes for more. A constant is included but not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported 
as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table A5: Site-Level Regressions of Log of AMI Mortality on  
Log of Average EQ-5D Health Gain 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable  Log of Sites’ AMI Mortality 
Explanatory Variable Casemix-
Adjusted?  No  Yes 
Procedure On Which Explanatory 
Variable Is Based  Hip Knee Groin Vein  Hip Knee Groin Vein 
                      Log of Sites’ Average EQ-5D 
Health Gain 
 -0.0570 -0.0242 0.0172 0.0402  -0.00833 0.0900 0.0396 -0.0378 
 (0.0965) (0.0883) (0.0321) (0.0313)  (0.133) (0.124) (0.0517) (0.0369) 
           Observations  705 696 818 611  703 698 831 635 
R-squared   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003  0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Table reports coefficients from univariate regression of log of Hospital Sites’ AMI Mortality on log of Hospital Sites’ Unadjusted or 
Casemix-Adjusted Average EQ-5D Health Gain. See Figure 2 notes for AMI sample restrictions. Average PROMs health gains from hip 
and knee replacements include both primary procedures and revisions. A constant is included but not reported. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table A6: Trust-Level Regressions of Log of First Differenced Standardised Hospital Mortality on  
Log of First Differenced Average EQ-5D Health Gain 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable  Log of Trusts’ First Differenced Standardised Hospital Mortality 
Explanatory Variable Casemix-
Adjusted?  No  Yes 
Procedure On Which Explanatory 
Variable Is Based  Hip Knee Groin Vein  Hip Knee Groin Vein 
                      Log of Trusts’ First Differenced 
Average EQ-5D Health Gain 
 0.0498 0.0934 -0.101 0.145  0.0995 -0.0149 -0.0806 0.158 
 (0.0879) (0.0968) (0.0978) (0.114)  (0.118) (0.0910) (0.102) (0.217) 
           Observations  133 123 104 83  119 132 95 40 
R-squared   0.002 0.008 0.010 0.020   0.006 0.000 0.007 0.014 
Table reports coefficients from univariate regression of log of Hospital Trusts’ First Differenced Standardised Hospital Mortality on log 
of Hospital Trusts’ First Differenced Unadjusted or Casemix-Adjusted Average EQ-5D Health Gain. See Figure 1 notes for SHM sources. 
Average EQ-5D health gains from hip and knee replacement in 2012/13 exclude data from patients undergoing revisions to these 
procedures; see Figure 1 notes for more. A constant is included but not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A7: Site-Level Regressions of Log of First Differenced AMI Mortality on  
Log of First Differenced Average EQ-5D Health Gain 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Outcome Variable  Log of Sites’ First Differenced AMI Mortality 
Explanatory Variable Casemix-
Adjusted?  No  Yes 
Procedure On Which Explanatory 
Variable Is Based  Hip Knee Groin Vein  Hip Knee Groin Vein 
                      Log of Sites’ First Differenced 
Average EQ-5D Health Gain 
 0.0403 -0.0475 0.0445 0.0869  0.106 0.0840 0.101 0.121* 
 (0.0785) (0.0913) (0.0803) (0.0948)  (0.0828) (0.0996) (0.0762) (0.0681) 
           Observations  150 132 155 121  145 139 169 128 
R-squared   0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007  0.011 0.005 0.010 0.025 
Table reports coefficients from univariate regression of log of Hospital Sites’ First Differenced Standardised Hospital Mortality on log of 
Hospital Sites’ First Differenced Unadjusted or Casemix-Adjusted Average EQ-5D Health Gain. See Figure 2 notes for AMI sample 
restrictions. Average PROMs health gains from hip and knee replacements include both primary procedures and revisions. A constant is 
included but not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is reported as follows: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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